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USSR Report

POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS

No. 1453

PEOPLES OF ASIA AND AFRICA

No. 2, Mar-Apr 1983

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Except where indicated otherwise in the table of contents the following is a complete translation of the Russian-language bimonthly journal NARODY AZII I AFRIKI, No. 2, Mar-Apr 1983

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SUMMARIES OF MAJOR ARTICLES

Nuclear Arms and Developing World -- by V. F. Davydov

The policy of nuclear nonproliferation is of paramount importance as an instrument in safeguarding international security and restraining the arms race. The article deals with problems which the world community has to tackle in implementing this policy. It discusses in this regard the situation in developing countries.

The article highlights such issues as, prevention of the nuclear power stations being used as a cover for military programs, discouraging non-nuclear states seeking to obtain the nuclear arms, the crucial role of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the threat involved in the nuclear ambitions of states at the point of obtaining the nuclear arms (Israel, South African Republic, Pakistan), the policy of the USA and other imperialist states which encourage these ambitions.

The article upsets the arguments opposing the policy of nonproliferation and demonstrates the hazards of the American concepts of a limited nuclear war and the U.S. policy of deploying nuclear arms abroad.

The article also raises the issue of non-nuclear zones and zones free from nuclear arms in the developing world. It emphasizes the importance of Soviet initiatives aimed at averting the danger of nuclear holocaust.

The developing nations and their ever-growing prestige in the international arena, the article concludes, are able to offer a positive contribution to the settling of the nonproliferation problem.

Liberated Countries in the System of Monetary Relations -- by B. N. Dobrovskiy

The monetary relations, which emerged within the framework of the world capitalist system, are an important aspect of the liberated countries' struggle for the establishment of a New International Economic Order. The unequal position of developing nations in this regard jeopardizes the attainment of genuine, i.e. economic independence. In the field of monetary relations developing states apply efforts to modify the international monetary system (IMS), secure access

to the sources of financing, settle the problems of aid and indebtedness. The reform of IMS includes the reorganization of the principles of the IMF functioning, the change of the international liquidity formation's procedure and settling of unbalanced international payments. The restructuring the developing nations stand should provide a guarantee of a solid foreign exchange base for financing their economic development and facilitate the redistribution of financial resources in their favor.

The analysis of drafts and proposals devoted to the restructuring of IMS allows to suggest that these documents reflect three major trends. The maximalist one, as represented by developing nations, advocates democratic principles and control over the system, its universality, establishment of an international monetary unit, which would ensure an automatic transfer of resources to developing countries, setting up of a special control body within the system and a radical change of the IMF policy towards young states. The conservative trend emphasizes the need for a more rigorous policy within the IMS and opposes the position of developing nations on each and every issue. The desire to preserve IMS underlies the liberal trend. The supporters of this trend offer to alleviate the position of developing countries by granting them insignificant concessions.

Secularization in India -- by B. I. Klyuyev

The term "secularism" is widely used in modern India but it is defined and consequently applied in practical politics in different ways. It is clear, therefore, that it should be analyzed with reference to the religious climate of India.

Religious sentiment is a complex phenomenon of the present-day Indian society. Reference to tradition only does not explain why it is a very potent force today. Social changes in India since Independence along with secular tendencies seem to have produced a new wave of religious feelings which is manifest not only in the growing activities of the established religious communities but in mushrooming cults of numerous Gurus, Babas and Matajis. The communal strife in the country goes on unabated.

Laboring under impressions of terrible communal riots right after Independence, the founders of the Indian Constitution tried to achieve two opposing goals as far as religion was concerned: to safeguard freedom of religion and to separate religion from politics. The same dichotomy is obvious in the actual policy of secularism. As a principle of equal respect to all the faiths, it certainly goes a long way in maintaining, even strengthening the religious sentiments and attitudes of different social layers of the Indian society. And it is exactly in this principle there lies its contradiction.

The Indian State successfully acts as a benign patron of all the faiths. But the policy of secularism proves poor and ineffective as an instrument in the fight against communalism and the growing menace of religious revivalism. The latter, especially the Hindu revivalism, is mounting its attack on the very principle of secularism asserting that it is alien to the Indian mind.

On the other hand, the democratic forces of India are insisting on the necessity to redefine the principle of secularism in terms of separation of religion from the State and its functions.

The problem is still there, for the communal tensions in the Indian society are appearing to be more and more destructive.

Specific Features of the Nigerian Army's Formation (1960-1966) -- by A. S. Vlahova

The article deals with the evolution of the Nigerian Armed Forces in the early 1960's. It discusses the government policy towards the army and the specific features of the officer's corps. By the mid-1960's the officer's corps did not represent a homogeneous whole. Its internal life was characterized by the predominance of protectionism and disruption of functional ties inherent in the Army. It bred closed groups based on non-formal, notably ethnic ties.

Ethnic and regional bias of the policy toward the Army, government's resort to the Army in suppressing internal unrest in Nigeria and elsewhere, personal loyalties of the high command to the ruling elite and participation of senior officers in the decision-making process were the factors which contributed to the politicization of the officers' corps and furthered its involvement in politics.

Fief Holders in China in the Late 14th Century -- by A. A. Bokshchanin

The distribution of fiefs in China was practiced from time immemorial. The nature of these possessions bears direct relation to the definition of the Chinese social and political structure. This problem therefore requires a thorough study. Even prima facie acquaintance with historical data shows that the ancient fiefs had been distinct from those which came into existence after the unification of China in the Han period (202 BC to 220 AD). The fiefs of the later periods also had their own distinct features.

The article analyzes the fiefs of the Ming period (1368-1644) and describes the rights and duties of their holders (wang).

Realizing that fiefs were prone to separatism, the central government tried to counterweight this tendency by decrees. The transfer of the title was to be endorsed by the Emperor, wangs had to observe daily rites, laid down in a special book "The Behests of the Ancestor", to perform a ritual symbolizing their subordination to the central court, pay visits to the capital and keep there their sons as honored hostages. The right of wangs to command troops during the time of peace and administer their subordinates was also limited.

The position of wangs in the Ming Dynasty was an ambiguous one. On the one hand, they were entrusted certain power within their fiefs, on the other hand, it was restricted by the center. By the 14th century the fiefs, although controlled by

the center, consolidated and became a threat to the central power. Following the internecine war and coup d'etat (1399-1402) the government gradually crushed the political might of fiefs. The social and economic privileges of vangs, however, remained intact.

Problems of Formation Transition in Antagonistic Societies of the East --
by N. A. Simoniya

The nations of the East and their development in terms of the theory of formations have been widely debated by scholars throughout the world. They have been a subject of numerous discussions among Soviet scholars. It is no wonder, for practical and political aspects of the problem, notably, the present-day political orientation of Eastern countries, both at home and abroad, transpire through the academic debate.

The article offers the author's contribution to the solution of one of the most important aspects of the formation development of the nations of the East, i.e. that of the transitional period. The point is that since the colonial conquest, which historically constituted the moment when the natural historical evolution of Asian societies started to bear the imprint of the historical development of European colonial powers, "pure" formation development is no longer observed in the development of Eastern nations. Throughout the centuries and over the last decades synthesized forms of social development change one another. First, the colonial synthesis comes into existence and enters the stage of its disintegration in the era of imperialism. Concomitantly, a colonial country forms a combined society comprising three major elements: colonial synthesis, national capitalist structure and archaic (precolonial) traditional structures. The nature of these components and their actual correlation determine in the main the character of the national liberation movement and revolutions in the East.

The attainment of political independence brings about a modification of the combined social structure. The colonial synthesis transforms into a neocolonial one and in the vast majority of states ceases to be a leading component of this structure. It is replaced by the national and state component which gradually integrates neocolonial structures and modifies the archaic ones and lays down the foundation of a homogeneously integrated national social structure.

The Lowest Strata in Oriental Social Urban Structure -- by V. Ya. Belokrenitskiy

The article is an attempt to substantiate the approach to the lowest urban strata as a specific and, in a sense, independent social complex. This complex (so far as the bourgeois social and class structure is concerned) comprises a portion of the so-called intermediate strata. The article emphasizes the characteristics, which distinguish this complex from another important portion of intermediate class groups relating to the middle urban strata.

The article analyzes the structure of the lowest urban strata which consists of the nonproletarian, semiproletarian and lumpen proletarian groups. It also examines their economic, social and political characteristics and the sources, which supply newcomers to these groups.

Taking the notion of the differentiation of the present-day developing states as a starting point, the article suggests that in one group of the liberated countries of the East the middle urban strata, represented primarily by the petite bourgeoisie, have grown into the largest social complex. The lowest strata, in the first place the semiproletariat, are the largest complex of the other group, which includes densely populated states of South Asia.

With a special reference to Pakistan the article probes into the actual relations between the elements, which make for the lowest urban strata, and estimates in terms of quantity the nonproletarian strata (those which are in the main still beyond the capitalist system of production), semiproletarian strata (which are partly included into this system) and lumpen proletarian, or economically passive strata.

The article offers illustrations of discrepancies between the social aspirations and political behavior of the middle and lowest urban strata of Pakistan in the 1970's. At the same time, the article notes the impact of the petit bourgeois ideology upon the semiproletarian masses.

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PROBLEMS OF NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION IN THIRD WORLD DISCUSSED

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 2, Mar-Apr 83 (signed to press 11 Mar 83) pp 3-13

[Article, published under the heading "Articles," by V. F. Davydov: "Nuclear Weapons and the Developing World"]

[Text] At the time when all progressive mankind was extensively celebrating the 60th anniversary of establishment of the USSR, standard-bearer of the struggle for international security and to eradicate war from the experience of human society, the attention of the world community was drawn particularly forcefully to pressing issues pertaining to the campaign to preserve peace on our planet.

A policy directed toward preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons plays an important role in the cause of preserving peace, strengthening international security, and holding the arms race in check. Today more than 100 countries throughout the world, including the majority of developing nations in Asia and Africa, support this policy, of which the Soviet Union and the nations of the socialist community are determined champions. Thanks to their growing political weight and authority in the international arena, they are capable, together with the Soviet Union and the other socialist and peace-loving nations, of exerting considerable positive influence toward resolving this practical and relevant problem.

Today there are very few who doubt that an increase in the number of countries possessing nuclear weapons is fraught with disastrous consequences both for the entire world community as a whole and for each country individually. The majority of researchers, in spite of difference in their concepts and views, agree that mankind is today faced with a choice, which demands a decision without delay: either to exercise genuine control over the nonproliferation of nuclear arms, or to accept the risk of the destruction of civilization from the employment of these weapons.

This problem is becoming particularly urgent and complex because, as the scientific and technological revolution advances and intergovernmental cooperation in the area of nuclear energy expands, the number of countries capable of building nuclear weapons is growing. In the estimate of experts there were 20 such "near-nuclear" or "threshold" countries at the beginning of the 1980's,

while by the year 2000 their numbers may increase to as many as 40.¹ Growing energy requirements, increase in the prices of conventional types of fuel, and the development of highly economical and safe types of nuclear power reactors are reasons for the attractiveness and advantages of continued development of nuclear power stations. As of the beginning of 1983 277 nuclear power stations were operating in 24 countries, representing a total generating capacity of 157,500 megawatts, and producing approximately 9 percent of the world's electricity. According to IAEA forecasts, by 1990 nuclear power plants will represent a total generating capacity of 430,000 megawatts, or 18 percent of the world's electric power. Of the 33 countries in which nuclear power stations will be operating by 1990, 10 are developing countries. Those 38 nuclear power plants which they will possess will have a generating capacity of 24,000 megawatts (approximately 3 percent of the electric power consumed in those countries).² It is anticipated that by the year 2000 the combined generating capacity of nuclear power plants in developing countries will total 100,000-190,000 megawatts, while the percentage share of nuclear power in generating electricity will be 9-13 percent.³

Expansion of research and practical developments in the field of nuclear power engineering has an objective foundation -- mankind must prepare in advance to replace oil, coal, and other conventional energy resources with new sources of energy as reserves of the conventional resources become exhausted. It is essential, however, to take all possible steps to ensure that this does not bring with it an increased threat of thermonuclear catastrophe.

We know that a by-product is produced in the process of operating nuclear power facilities -- plutonium. This fissionable material, if suitably processed, can be used to build weapons. Many countries are already today producing at nuclear power plants sufficient quantities of plutonium to build nuclear bombs. According to present estimates, by the year 2000 a sufficient quantity of plutonium will be obtained from the operation of nuclear power plants to build each year 30,000 atomic bombs equal in yield to the bomb dropped on Nagasaki.⁴ Methods of processing nuclear power plant waste materials to recover plutonium are today no longer a secret, as is also the case with methods of enriching uranium, which is also suitable -- in enriched form -- for building nuclear weapons.

In this situation, where enlargement of the "nuclear club" may become a reality, the role of the 1968 Nuclear Arms Nonproliferation Treaty becomes sharply increased as a political obstacle in the path of proliferation of nuclear weapons. To date 118 nations, including many countries in Asia and Africa, have signed and ratified this treaty. Pursuant to the treaty, nations possessing nuclear weapons pledge not to transfer to any other party nuclear arms and other nuclear explosive devices, while nations which do not possess nuclear weapons pledge not to build or acquire them.

IAEA is charged with monitoring nations' compliance with the terms of this treaty. This monitoring does not infringe the sovereign rights of developing nations, and not only does not create any obstacles to their scientific-technical and economic development but on the contrary, fosters international cooperation in peaceful uses of the atom.

The nonproliferation treaty laid down a solid foundation for peaceful use of nuclear energy and has become an important factor in restraining the nuclear arms race. It effectively serves the interests both of large and small countries, both nuclear and non-nuclear, both industrially developed and, particularly, developing countries. Further expansion of signatories to the treaty, giving this treaty greater universality, and increasing the effectiveness of the IAEA monitoring system, could become additional guarantees that atomic energy will be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. Approximately 50 nations have to date failed to sign the nonproliferation treaty, however, including two nuclear powers -- the PRC and France. Non-signatories also include a number of Afro-Asian countries with a highly-developed nuclear industry -- Israel, the Republic of South Africa, Pakistan, and others. There are still forces in the world seeking to acquire nuclear weapons in order to threaten peace-seeking peoples. Of great importance in this situation is the task of thwarting moves by reactionary regimes which threaten the cause of peace and the implementation of a consistent policy directed toward strengthening nonproliferation.

The annual resolutions of UN General Assembly sessions call precisely for this, and precisely this is advocated by the Soviet Union, the other socialist countries, and the majority of developing countries in Asia and Africa.

* * *

Serious concern is aroused in the world community by the fact that such "threshold" countries as Israel, South Africa, and Pakistan, with direct connivance by and sometimes the assistance of Western powers, are extremely close to producing nuclear weapons.

According to the estimates of experts, the level of nuclear research being conducted in Israel is extremely high; this nation already possesses both nuclear technology and fissionable materials which can be used for military purposes. In carrying out an agreement entered into in 1955, calling for cooperation in the nuclear area, the United States provided Israel with a 5-megawatt research reactor and enriched uranium, more than 250 Israeli nuclear scientists have received training in the United States. While this reactor is subject to IAEA inspection, Israeli authorities prohibit international inspection of that country's other nuclear reactor, built with French systems in the town of Dimona. In addition to the reactors, Israel has a uranium enrichment plant, which can also recover plutonium from spent fuel rods. Each year the reactor in Dimona produces 8 kilograms of plutonium. More than 100 kilograms have been amassed since it went on-line -- in the estimate of experts, this quantity is sufficient to build almost 20 atomic bombs, each of which is equal in yield to the bomb dropped on Hiroshima. "Without question," states E. Lefever of the Brookings Institution in the United States, "building nuclear bombs is fully within the capability of Israeli scientists, a large number of whom acquired valuable information and experience through participation in the French and U.S. nuclear arms development programs."⁵ Many informed observers believe that Israel already possesses nuclear weapons.

Israel also possesses effective means of delivering nuclear weapons. Thanks to U.S. assistance, Israel presently possesses F-4 strategic bombers, F-16 fighter-bombers, with a combat radius in excess of 600 kilometers (this radius can be doubled with midair refueling), as well as Lance missiles with a range of up to 100 kilometers. With the technical assistance of U.S. scientists, Tel Aviv is speeding up work on perfecting its own land-based ballistic missile, the "Jericho," designed to deliver nuclear warheads, and is also developing the technology to produce cruise missiles.

Israel is actively collaborating in the nuclear field with the racist regime in the Republic of South Africa. This cooperation derives from the coinciding expansionist aims of Zionism and racism. South Africa provides Israel with the needed uranium to develop a nuclear potential. South Africa in turn seeks to acquire nuclear technology available in Israel. Israeli ruling circles make no secret of the fact that Israel is capable of building nuclear weapons. On the contrary, they seek to intimidate the Arab countries with this fact.

An action perpetrated by the Israeli Air Force in June 1981 was extremely dangerous in its potential consequences -- a pirate raid on an innocent civilian nuclear research center near Baghdad. Iraq is a signatory to the non-proliferation treaty, and all Iraqi nuclear activities are consequently under the scrutiny of IAEA. This Israeli action opened up before the international community the sinister prospect of "reactor conflicts" equivalent in consequences to conflicts with the employment of nuclear weapons. It is a well-known fact that the destruction of any nuclear facility can cause radioactive substances to be released into the atmosphere, contaminating large areas. According to the calculations of experts, for example, the destruction of a single 1 million kilowatt nuclear power plant is comparable to radioactive contamination caused by the detonation of a 1 megaton nuclear bomb on a short-term basis, and would exceed it by tens of times over a period of a year and more.⁶

The majority of countries which are signatories to the nonproliferation treaty strongly condemned Israel's actions and addressed the urgent question of preventing such actions, which are fraught with catastrophic consequences to peace. In October 1982 the delegates to the 26th Session of the IAEA General Conference in Vienna concluded that the destruction of innocent nuclear installations should be considered equivalent to an attack employing nuclear weapons. The USSR, in conformity with the wishes of the signatory nations to the nonproliferation treaty, proposed that the 37th Session of the UN General Assembly consider the following agenda item: "Increasing efforts to eliminate the threat of nuclear war and to ensure the safe development of nuclear power engineering."⁷ This resolution, which condemns the deliberate destruction of innocent nuclear installations, was approved by the overwhelming majority of nations at the UN General Assembly session. As for the United States, it made vigorous attempts to shield its ally when the majority of IAEA's non-nuclear member nations proposed expelling Israel from this organization. In spite of Tel Aviv's aggressive actions in Lebanon, Washington is continuing massive deliveries of the most modern arms to its ally.

Just as in the case of Israel, Western countries played a main role in developing the nuclear potential of the Republic of South Africa. Immediately following World War II the United States and Great Britain, attracted by the

large reserves of uranium ore in South Africa, gave it effective assistance in developing a nuclear industry. A total of 27 mines with 17 uranium ore processing plants were built with the direct participation of Anglo-American companies. In the 1960's the United States built two nuclear reactors in the Republic of South Africa -- SAFARI-1 and SAFARI-2. The enriched uranium needed for their operation is supplied on a regular basis from the United States. The majority of the 120 physicists sent by the racist regime to Western countries for study and apprenticeship received their training at U.S. nuclear laboratories. Thanks to close connections with scientists in the FRG, Pretoria mastered the technology of the uranium enrichment process. France signed a contract with South Africa in 1976 to provide two nuclear power plants with a generating capacity of 1000 megawatts each.⁸ Pretoria developed the capability to produce nuclear weapons precisely as a result of such relations with Western nations. In 1976 J. Vorster, the then prime minister, made it known that South Africa would produce nuclear weapons if it became necessary. "We can enrich uranium and we possess uranium," he stated.⁹

Pretoria was intending to conduct open testing of nuclear weapons in August 1977. This action was thwarted by peace-loving forces.¹⁰ Mysterious nuclear flashes were observed off the coast of South Africa in 1979 and 1980, flashes which, in opinion of a number of experts, were very similar to nuclear weapons tests.

South Africa also possesses modern means of delivering nuclear weapons, in particular British-made Canberra and French Mirage aircraft, and long-range artillery capable of firing nuclear rounds. The London magazine EIGHT DAYS reported on 14 April 1981 that South African and Israeli specialists are building a nuclear submarine at a naval base near Capetown.

Also alarming are the nuclear ambitions of the Islamabad military regime, which stubbornly refuses to sign the nonproliferation treaty. The high level of development of Pakistan's nuclear program would be impossible without the assistance of the United States and other Western countries. A U.S.-Pakistan agreement on cooperation in the area of utilization of atomic energy was signed in 1954. Pursuant to this agreement, Washington sold Islamabad a 5 megawatt research reactor. In 1965 Canada provided Pakistan with a 125 megawatt reactor, operation of which is totally dependent on nuclear fuel imported from the United States. This reactor is capable of producing 137 kilograms of plutonium annually. Pakistani specialists have received training in the United States, Canada, the FRG, and other countries.

The United States removed its ban on military assistance to Pakistan and promised to provide that country with 3.2 billion dollars worth of military equipment, and in particular to sell it 40 F-16 fighter-bombers.

In the 1970's Pakistan adopted a policy aimed at building an extensive nuclear industry, including not only nuclear power plants but also plants for recovering plutonium from spent fuel rods and uranium enrichment plants. It was announced in 1975 that more than 10 nuclear power plants would be built in Pakistan by the end of the 20th century. Such a program, in view of that country's extremely limited financial resources, makes one wonder about the

intentions of the Islamabad "hawks." Suspicions became particularly intensified after Pakistan signed a contract with France in 1976 to purchase plutonium recovery plants. Columbia University professor Z. Khalilzad stated with full justification: "Pakistan's leaders have long realized that a peaceful nuclear program can bring their country closer to the development of a nuclear potential and can camouflage their actual goal -- implementation of a corresponding military program."¹¹ Statements were heard within certain Pakistani circles that if any neighboring non-nuclear countries (an allusion to India) were to test nuclear devices, the people of Pakistan "will eat grass," but will do the same.

Opposition by the world community to the further proliferation of nuclear weapons prevented France from implementing the agreement it had signed with Pakistan. Islamabad, acting through dummy companies, then undertook covert operations to purchase uranium enrichment technology and equipment in the United States, Great Britain, the FRG, and Switzerland. As a result, with direct connivance by Western countries, in the 1980's Pakistan succeeded in obtaining practically everything it needed to produce nuclear weapons. One can hardly doubt, for example, that U.S. ambassador to Pakistan R. Spires was fully knowledgeable about the matter when he noted in an interview with the Pakistani newspaper NOVAI VAKT in September 1982 that Pakistan was producing a large quantity of weapons-grade plutonium.¹²

Islamabad's actions cannot help but evoke legitimate concern in neighboring India, the government of which repeatedly made it clear that it would be forced to undertake response measures. A nuclear arms race in Southern Asia would have sharply negative consequences for security on that continent.

* * *

In case of a conflict development of the situation, the greatest danger of employment of nuclear weapons lies -- as regards the world of developing countries -- in the focal points of permanent tension in the Near East, in Southern and Southeast Asia, and in Southern Africa. The threat of military defeat and the hopes of reactionary, dictator regimes pursuing an expansionist policy to inflict substantial damage on the adversary, by destroying his military and industrial installations, can serve as motivations to employ nuclear weapons. Since World War II approximately 150 conflicts have taken place in the developing world. One can easily imagine what the development of events could lead to if the arsenals of warring countries contained nuclear weapons.

At the same time one still encounters claims in Western political literature that an increase in the number of nuclear nations will not increase the risk of nuclear conflict. If, they claim, both parties to a hypothetical conflict possess nuclear weapons, a balance will be established between them on the basis of "mutual deterrence," whereby the threat of being hit with a nuclear attack will also make employment of conventional forces impossible. As a result nuclear weapons, they claim, will even play a peacemaking and stabilizing role in relations between developing countries. To bolster this conclusion they usually make reference to a "balance of nuclear deterrence," which allegedly has ensured the preserving of peace between the USSR and the United States. In particular, U.S. military expert R. Sandoval holds such a view. "In defending its borders with nuclear weapons, any country which does not have territorial ambitions can go ahead and rove like a porcupine through the

thickets of international relations -- there is no threat to one's neighbors, but at the same time it would be risky to attack it," he claims.¹³ Similar views are propounded by University of California at Berkeley professor K. Walts. "The spread of nuclear weapons," he writes, "will continue in the future promoting the strengthening of peace."¹⁴

In actual fact the "balance of nuclear deterrence" does not at all increase stability or contribute to the security of nations. The entire history of Soviet-U.S. relations, and particularly the "cold war" period, attests to the fact that there continuously existed a risk of outbreak of a nuclear conflict. We can cite as examples the 1962 Caribbean crisis and the sharp escalation of the danger of nuclear war which took place at the end of the 1970's and beginning of the 1980's due to aggressive actions by U.S. imperialism. The experience of history attests to the fact that the nuclear arms race not only increases political tension but also increases the risk of a nuclear conflict. This risk, as we have noted, is intensifying as a result of the actions of today's "threshold nuclear" nations -- in the Near East and in Southern Asia. In conflicts where military operations are conducted with conventional weapons, nuclear weapons can also be employed with the element of surprise if one of the parties succeeds in building such weapons at the time of military operations (this was what happened, for example, in World War II). Intervention into local conflicts by imperialist nuclear nations can threaten a global nuclear catastrophe.

The "porcupine theory" and various notions about the "peacemaking" role of nuclear weapons can inflict irreparable damage on the cause of nuclear non-proliferation. The spread of nuclear weapons over the planet will also make it extremely difficult to resolve problems of limiting and reducing existing nuclear capabilities. At the present stage of Soviet-U.S. negotiations in Geneva on intermediate-range weapons, the fact that Great Britain and France possess nuclear forces must be taken into account. And if several dozen countries possess nuclear weapons, the very idea of nuclear disarmament will be even harder to achieve.

Critics of the idea of nonproliferation sometimes claim that it allegedly aims at perpetuating the division of nations into nuclear and non-nuclear and thus violates the principle of equality and justice in international relations. Attempts to prevent the further spread of nuclear arms are motivated, they claim, not so much by considerations of international security as by the endeavor on the part of nuclear powers to preserve the military status quo as well as their political and economic advantages. The further spread of nuclear weapons will, on the contrary, promote "equalization" of the status of countries, which in the long run should allegedly have a salutary effect on the evolution of international relations and on the process of nuclear disarmament. "The road to military equality," writes American professor A. Mazrui, for example, "lies initially through nuclear proliferation in third-world countries, and only subsequently through deatomization of each country."¹⁵

Such demagogic abstract arguments about "fairness" and "equality" ignore primarily the main question: will such a proposed "fair" and "equal" world survive in conditions of the global spread of nuclear arms? And it is by no means

mere happenstance that the overwhelming majority of the world's countries, including the nations of Asia and Africa, guided by considerations of national security, have signed the nonproliferation treaty. In doing this they realized that only a global policy of banning nuclear arms can ensure the preservation of life on our planet, and consequently their right as well to life, to development, and to progress.

In conditions of objectively necessary further development of nuclear power engineering, efforts should be concentrated on eliminating the motivations impelling non-nuclear countries to possess nuclear weapons. This is acknowledged by the majority of experts on matters of nonproliferation both in industrially developed and in developing nations. If a non-nuclear country feels safe from nuclear threats, the need to build nuclear weapons will also disappear.

The policy of weakening inducing motives, however, is being interpreted in a distorted way by the United States and the countries which support it. The Reagan Administration views strengthening existing military alliances, stationing U.S. forces, including nuclear forces, in more and more new areas of the world, and in increasing deliveries of conventional arms to "nuclear threshold countries" -- in short, close military-political cooperation with countries seeking to acquire nuclear arms -- as the principal ways to "weaken motives." Political scientists who support the present U.S. Administration also "substantiate" such a strategy. They claim that only a bloc policy, a policy aimed at achieving military superiority on a global scale, can prevent the spread of nuclear arms. "Giving aid or support in the area of gaining security in the form of nuclear guarantees, a defensive pact or military aid and, in a number of instances, the presence of U.S. combat units -- this is the only and the most effective way to encourage developing countries to refrain from acquiring nuclear weapons," writes E. Lefever.¹⁶

In practice, however, such a policy leads to increased international tension, to escalation of the arms race, and to intensification of the threat of nuclear war. Sagacious Western scholars note that the policy of "weakening motives" according to the U.S. model is fraught with a nuclear threat. The prestigious U.S. journal FOREIGN POLICY stated the following about U.S. military aid to Pakistan: "The United States is increasing the danger that military operations in Southern Asia with the employment of conventional arms could escalate into a nuclear conflict."¹⁷

* * *

The Soviet Union sees as the principal way to lessen and in the final analysis totally to eliminate motivations to acquire nuclear weapons in a general improvement in the world political atmosphere and in achieving genuine results in nuclear disarmament. This position is shared by the majority of liberated countries. At conferences on verification of the effectiveness of the non-proliferation treaty held in 1975 and 1980, and at the UN General Assembly special sessions on disarmament in 1978 and 1982, representatives of non-nuclear nations stressed that the success of the campaign against the spread of nuclear arms depends on consistent application and practical development of the articles of the above-mentioned treaty and related international agreements.

Of great importance thereby are pledges by nuclear nations never to employ and never to threaten the employment of nuclear weapons against countries which renounce the manufacture and acquisition of nuclear weapons and do not possess such weapons on their soil.

When entering into the nonproliferation agreement, non-nuclear countries are naturally interested in ensuring that their security is more strongly guaranteed as a result of this. International documents pertaining to guarantees of the security of signatory nations are already joining the nonproliferation treaty. These documents are for the purpose of guaranteeing the security of non-nuclear nations in case the latter are attacked with the employment of nuclear weapons or the threat of such an attack. Essential in order to exclude such a possibility is an unconditional pledge by all nuclear powers not to employ nuclear weapons against countries which do not possess such weapons. At conferences of nonaligned nations, these countries regularly insist on the urgent necessity of such a step by the nuclear nations.

The Soviet Union, which considers such demands by non-nuclear nations entirely legitimate, solemnly declared at the first special UN General Assembly session on disarmament on 26 May 1977 that it would never employ nuclear weapons against nations which renounce the manufacture and acquisition of such weapons and do not possess such weapons on their territory. At the 33rd UN General Assembly Session the Soviet Union introduced a proposal calling for an international convention strengthening guarantees of the security of non-nuclear nations. In spite of the fact that the majority of the world's nations support this proposal, and in spite of repeated appeals by the UN General Assembly to expedite the drafting of such a convention, the United States and its allies continue to block the reaching of an agreement on this issue by the Geneva Disarmament Committee.

The basis for Washington's negative approach is its desire to continue "nuclear diplomacy" against developing countries, to maintain freedom of action in nuclear preparations, and to reserve for itself the option of fighting "limited" wars on foreign soil. Washington plans to deploy new U.S. nuclear missile systems as far as possible from U.S. soil. U.S. nuclear missile weapons in Western Europe — the Pershing II and cruise missiles, which are scheduled for deployment in 1983 — will be aimed not only eastward but southward as well; they can become an instrument of nuclear blackmail against the African Mediterranean nations and the countries of the Near East. U.S. forward-based weapons are also deployed in the Far East and the Western Pacific. Concentration in the Indian Ocean of large U.S. naval forces possessing nuclear potential pursues the same aims.

Postwar history contains many examples of where the United States threatened to employ nuclear weapons: the U.S. aggression in Korea and Indochina, the Indo-Pakistani (1971), and the Iranian-U.S. (1980) crises. According to calculations by the Brookings Institution, in the period from 1946 through 1975 the United States considered on 19 separate occasions the possibilities of employing nuclear weapons, and on 215 occasions actually deployed or threatened to employ such weapons.¹⁸ This shows how necessary are international legal obstacles against the employment of nuclear weapons. This will also lessen the desire to possess such weapons on the part of those nations which have not yet abandoned schemes of extracting military advantage from this.

In a situation where the West is impeding the achievement of a worldwide agreement on this score, the initiative in strengthening the security of non-nuclear nations against nuclear threats can proceed from these countries themselves. The Soviet Union has stressed repeatedly that it is prepared, even without waiting for like moves on the part of the other nuclear nations, to enter into a treaty agreeing not to employ nuclear weapons against any other country in the world without a single exception. The non-nuclear nations are in a position to commence the process of formal agreement on guarantees of security, entering into such agreements with the USSR and at the same time appealing to the other nuclear nations with like proposals. Countries which have pledged not to produce and not to possess nuclear weapons on their soil can legitimately demand, as compensation for renouncing the acquisition of nuclear arms, a formal agreement that nuclear weapons will not be employed against them. If such agreements were entered into, many of the "near-nuclear" nations, which continue to hold the "nuclear option" open for themselves, would think twice before making the decision to produce their own nuclear weapons. The possession of nuclear weapons in this situation would lead to a weakening of their security in comparison with that of non-nuclear nations which have received guarantees that nuclear weapons will not be employed against them.

Nuclear-free zones are called upon to play an effective role in strengthening nuclear nonproliferation. Participation in these undertakings by countries which still refuse to sign the nonproliferation treaty can to a certain degree lessen the threat that they will acquire nuclear weapons. In this instance nuclear-free zones can become a substantial additional obstacle in the path of further spread of nuclear arms. In the present situation, where the United States is developing more and more new nuclear weapon systems intended for deployment on foreign soil (neutron bombs, cruise missiles, various tactical nuclear weapons for so-called "theaters of military operations"), non-nuclear countries which are signatories to the nonproliferation treaty can make a tangible contribution to the cause of restraining the nuclear arms race, banning by treaty the use of their territory for nuclear preparations. Article VII of the nonproliferation treaty confirms the right of nations to establish nuclear-free zones.¹⁹

Each year UN General Assembly sessions adopt resolutions supporting the establishment of nuclear-free zones -- in Africa, in Southern Asia, and in the Near East. There already exists in international practice a precedent for international-law establishment of a nuclear-free zone -- the signing of the "Tlatelolco Treaty" in 1967 by the countries of Latin America. A public movement for the establishment of nuclear-free zones is presently gaining momentum in many countries of the world which are troubled by the danger of nuclear catastrophe. Not only entire continents or extensive geographic regions but also individual countries could become nuclear-free zones.

The main thing in establishing nuclear-free zones is to ensure that the corresponding agreements truly guarantee that the interested nations are transformed into a zone which is totally free of nuclear weapons and would contain no loopholes either for circumvention of the nuclear-free status on the part of "near-nuclear" nations or violation of this status by nuclear powers. Such agreements should provide on the one hand for pledges by non-nuclear nations

not to build their own nuclear weapons and not to permit deployment of another country's nuclear weapons on their soil, and on the other hand they should provide for pledges by nuclear nations not to employ nuclear weapons against countries in the nuclear-free zone and not to act in violation of its status -- not to deploy or transport nuclear weapons within the boundaries of a nuclear-free zone.

The Soviet Union totally supports the aspiration of non-nuclear countries toward establishment of zones free of nuclear weapons. The USSR acceded to Protocol II of the "Tlatelolco Treaty." It is a well-known fact that the Soviet Union also supports this idea for other regions of the world.²⁰

Other nuclear nations -- the United States, Great Britain, France, and China -- also pledged to observe the "Tlatelolco Treaty." But the United States reserved the right to transport nuclear weapons across the territories of Latin American nations, which constitutes a violation of the nuclear-free status of Latin America.²¹ Official Washington does not acknowledge the right to nuclear-free zones for its military bloc and alliance partners. Great Britain, a U.S. ally, dispatched an armada of warships into the South Atlantic at the height of the Anglo-Argentine conflict over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands, a naval force which included nuclear submarines. The world press also noted the possibility that the warships were also carrying nuclear weapons, for the purpose of pressuring Argentina.²²

In contrast to the Soviet Union, which voluntarily pledged against first use of nuclear weapons, Washington stubbornly refuses to give similar assurances. U.S. leaders, pursuant to "Directive 59," officially declare the allowability of "limited" nuclear war on foreign soil, including first and foremost the territories of their allies where the Pentagon has military installations, and also state the intention of "achieving victory" in a "protracted" nuclear war.

An important condition which could facilitate the establishment of nuclear-free zones is an agreement among nuclear powers not to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of countries in which there are no nuclear weapons at the present time. In 1978 the Soviet Union introduced just such a proposal at the 33rd Session of the UN General Assembly. More than 100 countries supported this proposal, which was opposed only by the United States and its NATO and ANZUS bloc allies, plus Japan. The United States has rejected Soviet proposals calling for pledges not to deploy nuclear weapons in the Persian Gulf zone, for withdrawal from the Mediterranean of warships carrying nuclear weapons, and on nondeployment of nuclear weapons on the territory of non-nuclear Mediterranean countries.²³ Washington thwarted plans to hold a UN conference on turning the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace, and turned a deaf ear to an appeal by the USSR, made during an official friendly visit to the Soviet Union in 1982 by India's prime minister, I. Gandhi, that "top-level NATO and Warsaw Pact agencies make declarations that the sphere of action of these alliances does not extend to Asia, Africa, and Latin America."²⁴ The United States also reacts negatively to ideas calling for establishment of peace zones in other parts of Asia. Having 1500 foreign bases and more than 12,000 nuclear weapons deployed abroad (7,000 in Europe and 5,000 in other parts of the world, including Australia and Asian countries),²⁵ The Pentagon has opposed and continues to oppose all steps

which would create barriers to employment of its nuclear forces. According to reports in the press, the United States intends to deploy nuclear weapons on the island of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean and is considering their deployment in the Near East and on the African continent. The Pentagon has repeatedly acted in violation of a principle of the Japanese Government "not to possess, not to deploy, and not to produce" nuclear weapons.²⁶ U.S. military leaders are presently engaged in intensive preparations to deploy Pershing II intermediate-range missiles and cruise missiles in Asian countries. Basically there are no guarantees that the United States will not overturn the principle of nondeployment of nuclear weapons in peacetime in those Asian and African countries where there are U.S. military installations.

In some non-nuclear countries of Asia and Africa there is still harbored the dangerous illusion that inasmuch as they in fact constitute nuclear-free zones, there is no acute need to formulate this status legally. The experience of history indicates, however, that possibilities which exist today may disappear tomorrow due to Washington's militarist preparations. The establishment of nuclear-free zones could become an important contribution by the non-nuclear nations to the cause of nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation, détente, and toward ensuring reliable international security. Nuclear-free zones would place effective political, legal, and moral obstacles in the path of fanciers of military adventures.

Non-nuclear nations have repeatedly pointed to the fact that nonproliferation of nuclear weapons can be consolidated only if the nuclear powers honor their pledges as stated in Article VI of the nonproliferation treaty, which states that each party "pledges, in a spirit of good will, to hold talks on effective measures to end the nuclear arms race."²⁷ The present U.S. course of policy aimed at an unprecedented increase in nuclear potential and its refusal to enter into an agreement with the USSR in the area of nuclear disarmament are in sharp contrast with the interests of the security of nations which are voluntarily renouncing the manufacture of their own nuclear weapons.

The majority of non-nuclear countries of Asia, Africa and other regions of the world advocate the urgent necessity of halting the arms race, which threatens a world nuclear catastrophe, and advocate outlawing nuclear weapons and excluding them from the domain of international relations. The Soviet Union and the other socialist nations fully share these aspirations. "The USSR," stressed CPSU Central Committee General Secretary Yu. V. Andropov at the November (1982) Central Committee Plenum, "totally rejects the view of those who attempt to claim that force and arms decide everything and will continue to do so. Peoples are marching onto the stage front of history as never before. They have obtained the right to vote, which nobody can stifle. They are capable, through aggressive and purposeful actions, of ending the threat of nuclear war, of preserving peace, and therefore life on our planet as well."²⁸

One of the principal measures to end the nuclear arms race is a total ban on all nuclear weapons testing. This would create a reliable block against the development of increasingly more sophisticated and lethal kinds of nuclear weapons. At the same time the total banning of nuclear testing would make it difficult to build nuclear weapons for countries which would like to acquire

such weapons in violation of the nonproliferation agreement. Having precisely these tasks in mind, the Soviet Union submitted for consideration at the 37th Session of the UN General Assembly "Main Provisions of a Treaty on a Total and General Ban on Nuclear Weapons Testing." The majority of countries in Asia and Africa, as well as from other regions of the world, voiced support for the Soviet initiative.

Today, when increasingly more extensive mastery of peaceful nuclear technology and acquisition of suitable technical knowledge can facilitate the possibility of transitioning to military nuclear programs, international policy in the area of nonproliferation is faced with new tasks — it demands not confrontation but détente, not a nuclear arms race but genuine nuclear disarmament. Its ultimate effectiveness will depend on the development of a global negative approach to the very fact of possession of nuclear weapons, which should be encouraged by their practical actions both by nuclear and non-nuclear countries, both by signatories and non-signatories to the Nuclear Arms Nonproliferation Treaty. Adoption of further effective measures aimed at preventing spread of the nuclear threat is one of the most important directional thrusts in the campaign for international security. The countries of Asia and Africa are also capable of making a large contribution toward achieving success in this campaign.

FOOTNOTES

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REASONS FOR DIVERSITY OF POSTCOLONIAL DEVELOPMENTS IN ASIAN STATES EXAMINED

Moscow **VARODY AZII I AFRIKI** in Russian No 2, Mar-Apr 83 (signed to press 11 Mar 83) pp 55-66

[Article, published under the heading "Problems of Methodology," by N. A. Simoniya: "Problems of System Transition in Antagonistic Societies of Asia in the Contemporary Era"; passages highlighted by use of double-spaced words enclosed in slantlines]

[Excerpt] If we now attempt to "position" individual Asian countries on the above described theoretical canvas of the evolution of colonialism, the discrepancy between the concrete historical development of many countries of this model (in its full extent) will immediately be revealed. And this is natural, just as it is natural that the abstract-theoretical model of capitalism portrayed by K. Marx in "Das Kapital" was not adequate to the future structure of specific Western countries. What are the reasons for such a disparity? We shall list at least a few of what we feel are the most important of these reasons:

1. /Difference in "soil" type/. In different countries or even in different regions of certain countries of Asia, colonialism encountered a far from uniform level and type of structural development. This in large measure determined both the degree of resistance of the "soil" to the penetration of colonialism and the methods of action by the latter. In some countries the level and nature of structural development were such that the local human material (productive resource) proved unsuitable for the direct drawing of society into colonial synthesis. Colonialism thereupon, to make up for the lacking components of colonial synthesis, utilized alien, nonindigenous ethnic material. This was achieved either by means of an influx of a sufficient number of settlers from the home country (Algeria and elsewhere), or by means of massive importation of labor from neighboring colonies (for example, from India into Burma and Ceylon), or by drawing it from technically sovereign Asian nations (Chinese immigrants in Southeast Asia). In some instances, however, colonialism was able to manage with available local resources, one of the factors in which was the organization of domestic interethnic division of labor (India and elsewhere).

2. /Differences between "colonialisms"/. This factor played a no less significant role. The home countries themselves differed from one another in

level of socioeconomic and military-political development and in their role in international division of labor. Their colonial policies and methods of economic activity also differed. Some (England) incorporated trade-monetary relations to a large degree and thoroughly destroyed the old land relations, while others (Holland, Portugal, Spain) strengthened or slightly modified the feudal system. Home countries also differed in degree of infiltration of Western political and intellectual culture into the colonies. (One can scarcely consider mere happenstance, for example, the fact that all four Asian countries -- India, Sri Lanka, Singapore, and Malaysia -- in which the form of bourgeois parliamentarianism which arose after gaining independence has been maintained up to the present day, although with certain modifications, were British colonies).

3. /Colonization taking place at different times/. Of even greater importance than the two preceding factors was the time when a given country (region) became incorporated into the system of colonial division of labor. Obviously the results of 200-300 and 30-40 years of colonial rule could not be identical.³ Only a few Asian nations had gone through the complete cycle of colonial development, including the mature stage of the third phase of colonialism (as India, for example), by the time they achieved political independence. Those, however, which were drawn into the orbit of the colonial system of imperialism much later constitute abbreviated or truncated versions of colonial development. Some of these virtually began this development immediately with the second phase, entering into the system of classic colonial division of labor. Others were still in the second phase when they were liberated from colonial dependence, and here a local capitalist structural edifice was virtually lacking. In still other cases, certain structural elements characteristic of the subsequent phase -- a modified colonial synthesis, for example -- appeared "ahead of schedule," while still in the second phase. In other words, in many Asian countries there was observed a displacement and mutual superposition of different phases of colonial development.

4. /Specific features of semicolonial territories/. The semicolonial territory constitutes a unique variant of the "home country-colony" system. The percentage share in Asia of this group, both as regards number of countries and total population, was quite substantial. It included, for example, such countries as China, Thailand, Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and others. The principal specific features of these countries consisted in preservation of formal political sovereignty and traditional superstructural institutions. In most cases (although not always) this led to conflictive consequences. On the one hand the direct superstructural obstacles, in the person of monarchic regimes, which stood in opposition to national liberation, were much weaker here than in the colonies. It is obviously not mere happenstance that primary and sometimes secondary political revolutions in Asia as well took place initially in these countries (Iran, Turkey, China, Thailand). On the other hand, however, traditional and semitradeional social structures were as a rule preserved in the semicolonial territories to a considerably greater degree and on a larger scale. And this not only dictated a narrowness and certain superficiality of political bourgeois revolutions, but also placed on them (and in some instances is continuing to place on contemporary secondary political revolutions) the strong imprint of traditionalism,⁴ which sometimes is even the cause of partial and temporary rollbacks of the revolution.

These and certain other features of development of the Asian countries and the nonuniformity of development of the colonial system of imperialism caused by them had as their consequence the forming of societies differing in their combined structure. These differences consisted both in the concrete correlation of the three principal components of these societies (national makeup, colonial and archaic structures) and in the nonuniform character of each of these components. It was noted above that there were countries in which colonial capitalism had succeeded not only in "grinding down" a substantial portion of the archaic structures but also in engendering the forces and factors of its own "negation" -- a national capitalist structural edifice, new social and political forces, and a mass national liberation movement. There are also countries in which substantial quantities of archaic traditionality have been preserved up to the present day. Quite important differences also existed in the composition of these structures proper. For example, countries could differ a great deal in ratio within the national structural edifice of elements of commercial and industrial, bourgeois and petit-bourgeois entrepreneurship, etc. Traditional structures could be unlike (from primitive-communal to late-feudal). Finally, differences in type of colonial structures are also quite substantial. In some instances "classic" colonial structures predominated, embodied in the old colonial division of labor (that is, small-scale raw materials production linked via an extensive network of trade-usurer capital to the large-scale capital of the former home countries). In other instances there was a high percentage share of modified colonial structures (industrial foreign-capital entrepreneurship directly in developing countries).

As a consequence of these differences, the level of maturity of internal preconditions for national liberation also had to be uneven: correlation of traditional and modern classes and political forces in the liberation movement; form and nature of revolutionary processes and new political regimes; prospects for socio-economic and political reforms, including the possibility of running ahead or, on the contrary, falling behind in social development.

It seems possible in light of the above to detail some important methodological aspects in assessing the character of the liberation movement and revolutions in Asian countries. First of all it would seem essential to take into consideration the fact that the character of liberation movements changed as they transitioned from one phase of colonialism to another. If we proceed from the above-described abstract-theoretical model of development of colonialism, in its first phase the struggle against the colonialists was of an "antiforeignist" nature.⁵ These were movements based on ethnocentrist perceptions of the surrounding world (medieval-particularist, patriarchal, tribal, etc) which were less developed than a nationalist movement; these movements were led by corresponding traditional forces and were directed toward preserving and consolidating the traditional underpinnings of society. Liberation movements of the first phase were objectively doomed to defeat precisely for this reason.

Isolated exceptions were possible only in those cases where, as in Japan, as a consequence of particular confluence of historical circumstances, antiforeignism began rapidly transforming and "becoming enriched" with nationalism prior to the time intervention by imperialism could block these processes. Thus in contrast to other colonial and semicolonial countries in Asia, here the formation of nationalism was not preceded by the phases of colonial synthesis and its dying.

This is also the reason for the strong "ground" of Japanese nationalism and the higher degree of natural-historical succession between traditionalism and nationalism.

A certain stabilization of the internal social conditions and a decline of the liberation movement would take place in the second phase, as colonial synthesis took root. Preconditions were gathering, on the basis of which national liberation movements would begin to form within the third phase of colonial development. But once again the above-noted nonuniformity of development of colonialism (domestic and regional) was leading to a situation where traditionalist forces of various types were continuing to operate in the era of imperialism alongside forces of national liberation. Even in countries which had already advanced deep into the third phase of colonialism, there was observed practically everywhere a revival of traditionalist forces, both under the influence of an upsurge in the national liberation movement and as a result of the further encroachment by colonialism into areas and domains of traditionalism which it had previously not touched. National and traditionalist streams in the liberation movement could interweave with one another or operate in parallel (less frequently -- in an antagonistic contest).

The range of specific historical deviations from this abstract theoretical model of development of the liberation struggle was much broader in the area of the superstructure than in the domain of foundation phenomena. Deviations in the direction of traditionalism were due not only to the existence of traditional structures but also to the fact that population groups which at the polyeconomic level were already involved in colonial synthesis or a part of the indigenous capitalist structural edifice but nevertheless were captive to traditionalist ideology and psychology, also sometimes marched under the banner of traditionalism. There were also observed deviations in the other direction, that is, in the direction not only of the historical past but the future as well, for not only nationalism ripens in the third phase of colonial development in the colonies and semicolonial territories; socialist ideas of various shadings also make their way there. As a result revolutionary liberation processes also contained elements of socialist directional thrust. A qualitative change at this level took place following the Great October Revolution, as well as in connection with the victory of the Soviet Union over fascism in World War II. In certain instances this led to the /direct/ evolution of national liberation revolutions into national-democratic revolutions (China, Vietnam, Korea) thanks to the existence of world socialism and under the influence of its victories in the antifascist struggle.

Alongside the above, the regional factor also had an effect, that is, the mutual influence of the Asian countries on one another. The fact that the process of national liberation following World War II assumed a virtually universal character is due in large measure to a "chain reaction" caused by "demonstration effect." With few exceptions the first to launch an onslaught against the underpinnings of colonialism were countries with the ripest objective (economic, social and political) preconditions for a liberation revolution. But after the vanguard echelon had opened up breaches in the colonialist system, those countries which had not yet reached the same level in their colonial evolution, stimulated by successful examples, rushed into the breach. As a result of this

situation, over the course of one or two decades dozens of Asian countries entered the period of their independent socioeconomic and political development -- with quite diversified initial levels and differing historical conditions and capabilities. This not only predetermined certain disparities in the concrete content of the tasks of the transition period (first phase), the forms and methods of their implementation, but also contained the prerequisites for subsequent differentiation for developing countries, which began to be manifested increasingly more clearly in recent decades. In particular, the CPSU Central Committee Accountability Report to the 26th CPSU Congress states the following in this regard: "These countries are quite different. Some of them proceeded along the revolutionary-democratic path following liberation. Capitalist relations became consolidated in others. Some of them pursue a genuinely independent policy, while others today follow in the wake of imperialist policy. In short, the picture is rather variegated."⁶

* * *

The above explains why the transition period, in which former Asian colonial and semicolonial countries find themselves today, is characterized not only by the majority of those features which the European countries possessed in the first phase of early-capitalist evolution but also by important specific features; it is distinguished by qualitatively different phenomena, and different development prospects are possible here.

Indeed, as following many primary bourgeois revolutions in Europe, there occurred in contemporary Asian countries in the 1940's-1950's attempts to establish a parliamentary system but, just as in Europe in the first phase of capitalism, these experiments ended (with few exceptions) in failure as a consequence of the multistructure or combined nature of the society and in the final analysis led to establishment of various Bonapartist dictatorships. Just as in Europe, Bonapartist dictatorships in Asia attempted to perform the historical task of clearing the way for private-economy capitalism. Just as in Europe, early-capitalist development of a society was accompanied here by periodic crises of societal structures, which would be overcome either through reforms or by means of repeated political revolutions and revolutionary changes in the superstructure.⁷

By the end of the 1950's, however, it was becoming increasingly clear that there could be no simple repeat of European versions of societal development, for at least three basic reasons. First of all, as a consequence of the prior-noted combined nature of society; secondly, as a consequence of the fact that these countries were entering the first phase of their development in conditions where the developed part of the capitalist world had already approached the final stages of the third phase of its evolution. In other words, history had left no time for sequential passage through all phases of the capitalist system by the countries of Asia.⁸ Thirdly, due to the existence of and confrontation between the two world systems. All this predetermines the particularly crisis nature of the present transition period in the countries of Asia, the inevitability of uneven development, and the possibility of bypassing certain phases of societal development.

A consequence of the first reason is the fact that even throughout the present stage of development of the Asian countries, the problems of social revolution are closely linked with its national, antiimperialist aspects. Its difference from the preceding transition period (third phase of colonialism), however, consists in the fact that colonial synthesis is today not "dying" but withering away, and as a result of a purposeful struggle by young national states. Colonial synthesis today is garbed in neocolonialist vestments, and overcoming it is not only a process of integration of old colonial structures into an integral national societal organism but also achievement of economic independence, that is, elimination of neocolonialist aspects from international division of labor. It is precisely this distinctiveness which gives objective grounds for placing the Asian countries (just as other former colonies and semicolonial territories) into a special category of "developing countries."

Of course the national aspect of the struggle will weaken and the social aspect will intensify as developing countries advance through the first phase of their societal development. At the purely theoretical level the change in these relations can be presented as follows: predominance of the national over the social is still characteristic of the first stage of the transition period (first phase). Particularly since imperialism is still doing everything to promote this through its stubborn resistance and disinclination to acknowledge historical facts accomplished. At the second stage the national and social aspects are in a certain conditional balance, while at the third, final stage of the transition period, the social definitely predominates over the national.

Of course we can limit ourselves to the reminder that in this aspect as well substantial adjustments are required during transition to the level of a specific country. One important explanation is essential, however. The dialectic of change in the correlation between the national and social, and at the same time between internal and external conflicts will be manifested quite differently, in relation to the structural orientation of given nations. In countries proceeding along a capitalist road, the tendency toward predominance of the social over the national will signify: a) strengthening of the internal over the external aspects of revolutionary struggle, and b) as a consequence of this -- strengthening of social "solidarity" with developed capitalist countries (as developing nations become developed), which of course does not exclude the future possibility of conflicts of an interimperialist nature. In countries orienting toward socialism, strengthening of the social element takes place at an incomparably faster pace, and the main thing consists in the fact that to the degree to which anticapitalist tendencies strengthen and consolidate within these countries, there is also an increase in the degree of the social-class antagonism on the part of this group of developing nations toward countries of the imperialist system.

As for the influence of archaic traditional structures on the social development of the countries of contemporary Asia, in principle there is nothing specific or new in this phenomenon. Substantial elements of the traditional were also preserved in the historical past throughout the first phase of new structural development, forming a unique synthesis with contemporary societal structures (hence the transitional nature of the phase), frequently leading to recoils, to relapses of traditionalism in a given domain of societal activity and consciousness, etc. In those countries of contemporary Asia where especially large

strata of traditionalism were preserved as a consequence of uneven societal development, the forces of traditionalism get even in a unique manner, temporarily seizing the historical initiative from bourgeois-nationalist and revolutionary-democratic forces. Its political forces thereby, depending on the concrete correlation of forces and nature of the traditionalism, take a sharply antiforeignist position with strongly-marked anti-imperialist motivations (Iran), or close ranks (at least objectively) with imperialism (Pakistan).

A second important reason dictating a difference in the models of societal development of independent Asian countries from the development of European capitalism in the first phase has as its consequence a historical situation whereby bypassing the second (private-economy) phase of capitalist development becomes objectively unavoidable for the absolute majority of Asian countries. An apt statement by Indonesia's first vice president, M. Hatta, that the Indonesian bourgeoisie was born too late would seem also to apply to the bourgeoisie of the majority of Asian countries. These countries lack for the evolution of private-ownership capitalism those centuries which this evolution took in the European countries. The bourgeoisie as a separate class, as a class of private entrepreneurs, is today unable to perform a system-forming function. This leads to a particularly deep and protracted crisis of societal structures, a way out of which cannot be secured even by the classic variant of a Bonapartist dictatorship, which usually creates general conditions for the establishment of capitalism. This is why the state is today taking on the system-forming function.

As is indicated by the experience of many Asian countries, the latter circumstance leads to monopolization by the state and narrow social groups, linked to the state (the civil and military bureaucratic elite, aristocratic circles, nouveaux riches, neocompradors, etc), of the principal or leading domains of economic activity.

There has begun to develop a process of formation of a unique structural edifice of state monopoly capitalism (SMC). This of course is a specific structural edifice. It differs both in genesis and structure from the "classic" forms of SMC in the West (England, United States, France, etc). In the first place, the emergence of a state-monopoly structural edifice took place in reverse order, as it were: the state becomes involved in this process not in its final phase but is itself the initiator of and main participant in monopolization. Secondly, the very process of monopolization, as was noted above, encompasses an unusually narrow social stratum. Rapidly forming reactionary aristocratic-bureaucratic monopoly capital appropriates for itself the "cream" of bourgeois modernization, impeding the extensive development of democratic capitalism.

The above-mentioned nature of the genesis of SMC in Asia and the compressed timetable of emergence predetermined its formation in the form of a "skyscraper." While the classic SMC constitutes the apex of a cone, as it were, resting on a broad foundation of private-ownership capitalism and the small-scale commodity producing sector, which has developed over the course of centuries (let us recall V. I. Lenin's statement: "Imperialism and finance capitalism is the superstructure over old capitalism. If we demolish its top, old capitalism will be revealed"⁹), the Asian SMC lacks solid "subsoil" in the form of fairly broad contemporary private-ownership capitalist and petit-bourgeois social structures

with which it would be linked organically and genetically; it is this which predetermines the particularly conflict nature of internal structural inter-linkages and the shaky nature of the entire building (a graphic example is the fate of the Shah's regime in Iran).

The higher degree of vulnerability of Asian variants of SMC, however, does not totally eliminate the possibility of bypassing the second phase of capitalism. And this means that in a number of Asian countries already today, in conditions of a still uncompleted first phase of capitalism, elements and even structural edifices of SMC are emerging. In other words, the third phase of capitalism is beginning to "superimpose itself" onto the first. The emergence of dictatorships of a neo-Bonapartist type, that is, dictatorships tasked with securing the "early" changeover by the societal development of former colonies and semi-colonial territories into the third phase, is connected precisely with this circumstance. A consequence of this in the sociopolitical domain is the factor that the authoritarianism and bureaucratization of the state which are characteristic of the SMC phase "superimpose" onto the authoritarianism and bureaucracy which are inevitable at the phase of early-capitalist development.

Thus two transition periods (the first and third phases of capitalism) directly adjoin one another in the contemporary conditions of Asian countries. And the further things progress, the greater the degree to which features characteristic of transition of the second type will prevail over those which are inherent in transition of the first type (in essence but not in external forms). This conclusion also evidently applies to that very small group of Asian countries which have to date succeeded in overcoming by reformist methods crises of societal structures which have occurred (India, Singapore, etc). In spite of the fact that the bourgeoisie of these countries proved more mature and was able to maintain hold on political power within the framework of parliamentary systems, the general mechanisms and imperatives of overcoming backwardness in conditions of the contemporary world also dictate within this group of countries the necessity of extensive direct intervention by the state into the domain of societal production and into the processes of transition to the third phase. It is true that the model of state-monopoly structural edifice which is presently taking form will tend to be more "middle of the road" in this group of countries, borrowing features both from the Eastern and Western model of SMC.

Finally, the third reason which dictated the difference between the countries of Asia and the European historical past leads in some countries to complete re-orientation of system development, that is, to bypassing of capitalism. The Asian countries in question, being from a structural point of view at the phase of early-capitalist development at best, of course do not possess the requisite objective preconditions for directly building socialism. In this instance the influence of an external factor -- the world socialist system -- is unquestionable of decisive significance, providing the possibility of realization of socialist orientation. However, the fact of /emergence/ of this phenomenon cannot be entirely reduced solely to an external factor, although in this instance as well it plays an exceptionally important stimulating role. The very emergence of socialist orientation is also linked with "soil" factors -- by a spontaneous aspiration of the masses for universal equality and social justice, which inalterably characterizes mass movements of the most diverse eras.

In the historical past as well, of the European peoples in particular, those who expressed such aspirations succeeded in making their mark on the course of revolutionary events, and in temporarily coming into power in some instances. But in the past there were no worldwide conditions making it possible to "compensate" for the absence of important internal prerequisites for the realistic orientation of society toward socialism. And in particular, another feature of the contemporary era consists in the fact that today such "compensation" possibilities have appeared.

The concrete-historical experience amassed in recent decades attests to the fact that there exist two ways to transition to a socialist development orientation. In some countries it takes place as a consequence of the fact that it proved impossible to recover from the recurring crisis of societal structures either by means of reformist maneuvering or by means of strengthening Bonapartist dictatorships. At this point revolutionary democracy advances to the stage front of political leadership. In other countries there takes place, in the course of the national liberation struggle (armed or peaceful), a regrouping and demarcation of warring forces, as a result of which revolutionary democracy advances to the head of the revolutionary process and is swept to power on its wave. In the former instance what usually occurs is a "revolution from above," that is, a revolutionary change in power. Revolutionary democracy comes to power as a result of a military coup, and only then undertakes efforts to secure for itself a mass social base. Of course time is needed to achieve such a goal, and this fact makes the regime vulnerable to a certain extent. On the other hand, coming to power on the basis of revolutions "from below," that is, a mass revolutionary struggle at the initial stage, eliminates the acuteness of the problem of social base. All this is fairly typical only for the initial stage of revolution, for subsequently the situation may fundamentally change. For example, initial weakness of a regime's social base may gradually be overcome with sequential implementation of progressive social, economic, and cultural reforms. In like manner the mass nature of the base with a revolution from below cannot per se guarantee against degeneration of a regime and an end to socialist orientation.

We should note that socialist orientation has not been in the past and apparently will not become in the future the sole form of reorientation of the structural development of Asian societies to a socialist prospective. If a large part of the first phase of early-capitalist development has been completed, and particularly if the tendency toward "superimposing" the third phase onto the first phase has become fairly advanced, then socialist orientation as a concrete political form of the revolutionary process, led by revolutionary democracy, proves to be little probable.¹⁰ The practical experience of future revolutionary battles will unquestionably also demonstrate other forms and other approaches by Asian peoples to a socialist future.

FOOTNOTES

3. It is considered, for example, that Indonesia was under colonial domination by the Dutch for approximately 350 years. But this is true only in regard to certain areas of Java. Colonialization of the rest of the archipelago

was continuing in the 17th through 19th centuries, while some areas on the Outer Islands (beyond Java and Madura) were not finally placed under colonial administration until the beginning of the 20th century.

4. In such instances traditionalism can manifest itself not only in the course of an antimonarchic revolution, as was the case in Iran in 1978-1983, but also in countries the social evolution of which has already entered a channel leading in the future to socialism.
5. For more detail on this see "Sovremennyy natsionalizm i obshchestvennoye razvitiye zarubezhnogo Vostoka" [Contemporary Nationalism and Social Development in Non-Soviet Asia], Moscow, 1978, pp 178-180.
6. "Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS" [Proceedings of the 26th CPSU Congress], Moscow, 1981, page 11.
7. We should note that in this instance we are dealing precisely with first-phase crises, that is, crises which are connected with the unevenness of modernization of various multiple and combined social structures, not cyclic crises of overproduction, which are characteristic of the second phase, that is, the period of domination of private-entrepreneurship capitalism.
8. We shall note that even some capitalist countries (Italy, Germany, etc) bypassed certain stages of various phases in the development of capitalism.
9. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Works], Vol 38, pp 154-155.
10. Indicative in this respect are data on the typology of countries and territories in the developing world contained in a table prepared by V. Sheynis (AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA, No 1, 1980, page 33). Virtually all countries which have taken or attempted to take a path of socialist orientation are to be found in the lower and middle groups (by level of per capita gross national product in 1976), with the majority in the very lowest group. One should bear in mind, however, that in the last 15-20 years some countries of socialist orientation have achieved appreciable success, and if a similar table had been prepared at the end of the 1950's and beginning of the 1960's, the absolute majority of countries in the middle group would be in the lowest group.

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AGRARIAN POLICY IN THE LIBYAN JAMAHIRIYA

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[Article, published under the heading "Brief Articles," by D. G. Karakhanyan]

[Text] As recently as 20 years ago Libya was one of the most backward countries in Africa. Exploitation, from the beginning of the 1960's, of rich fields of high-quality crude oil opened up a new page in that country's economic history. The backward socioeconomic system, however, which was guarded over by a conservative monarchic regime, hindered utilization in the interests of the nation itself, of the large revenues being earned from the sale of oil. The revolution which took place in September 1969, carried out by patriotic officers, toppled the monarchic regime and created preconditions for progressive socioeconomic reforms, including in the area of agriculture.

We know that approximately 95 percent (of 177,000 square kilometers) of the country's surface is covered by desert and semidesert, with only 10 percent of its land suitable for grazing and agriculture. Libya contains no perennial streams or freshwater lakes. The dry beds of seasonal streams fill with water only during the winter rainy season. Due to a lack of water, a large part of the population was forced to lead a nomadic or seminomadic life. As recently as the 1960's nomads comprised approximately 20 percent, and seminomads 22 percent of this country's population, while only 37 percent of the population were engaged in settled agriculture. And yet Libya contains rather extensive areas suited for farming, with irrigation. Cultivation of grasslands in the Al-Jabal Al-Akhdar area alone could entirely meet Libya's grain needs.

Nonirrigation farming is the predominant type of agriculture in this country. Barley, sorghum, dates and olives are grown on nonirrigated acreage, and wheat is grown on irrigated land. Grain crop yields were very low in the past (approximately 1.5 quintals per hectare on nonirrigated land and 7-8 quintals on irrigated acreage). Even before the September Revolution, steps began to be taken to develop settled agriculture. The National Organization for Rural Settlement was established in 1965 for the purpose of moving the residents of small villages to lands being developed by the government. The new organization had to apply special efforts to convert nomadic tribes to a settled way of life. The government planned to assign plots of farmland to individual families. In Cyrenaica plans called for returning to the plow 20,000 hectares

of abandoned land and establishing 700 farms on this land. But settlers had difficulty becoming accustomed to their new home, and most of them abandoned their farms. Thus this organization unintentionally fostered migration of the rural population. The number of farms declined from 145,700 in 1962 to 125,000 in 1969.

From the very first days of the September Revolution the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) proceeded to devote increasing attention to problems of agriculture. Priority was given to the task of halting migration of peasants to town and returning some of them to agricultural production.¹ Laws ordering confiscation of lands belonging to the royal family and expropriation of land belonging to Italian colonists, promulgated in 1970, were extremely important actions taken by the revolutionary authorities. The nationalized property, which comprised approximately half of all lands suited for cultivation, was placed under a specially formed Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform. Newly-occupied fallow and virgin land was also transferred into the agrarian reform fund. "Highly-developed agricultural production," stressed M. Qadhafi, chairman of the Revolutionary Council, "shall become Libya's permanent oil."²

Performance of "green revolution" measures aimed at renovating agriculture became one of the main concerns of Libyan leaders in the postrevolutionary period. A number of organizations were established after 1969, specifically to deal with matters of agricultural development: these included, in addition to the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform, the Agricultural Scientific Research Center, the Libyan Agricultural Bank, the Ministry of State for Agricultural Development Affairs, and government-run companies for marketing agricultural produce, for drilling water wells, for importing agricultural machinery and equipment, etc.³ The above-listed organizations have been directing their activities toward implementation of the country's 10-year agricultural development plan spanning the period 1973-1983. The state has allocated more than 1,700,000 Libyan dinars to the implementation of this plan.⁴

Capital investment in agriculture totaled 526.7 million Libyan dinars in the period 1973-1975. Of the 105,000 hectares slated for irrigation, 35,000 hectares had been planted to crops by the end of 1975, plus 108,000 hectares of 215,000 hectares of designated nonirrigated acreage.⁵ Gross agricultural output increased from 43.6 million Libyan dinars in 1972 to 82 million in 1975, that is, an increase of 88 percent.⁶ Harvests of the principal agricultural crops were increasing: wheat rose from 42,000 tons in 1972 to 107,000 in 1975; barley increased from 116,000 to 216,000 tons; vegetables increased from 382,000 to 620,000 tons; olives increased from 94,000 to 120,000 tons. Animal husbandry was also growing: cattle increased from 101,000 head in 1972 to 170,000 in 1975. Trees were planted in the desert to hold the sand in place. A total of 52 million trees were planted in the seven years following 1969. In addition, 16 million fruit trees were planted.

Libya's five-year economic and social development plan for 1976-1980 called for bringing to an end the existing gap between the petroleum industry and other sectors of the economy and for the building of a solid industrial-agrarian foundation under the national economy, with emphasis on building heavy-industrial enterprises. This plan called for further development of the "green revolution"

and called for Libya to achieve complete self-sufficiency in principal food-stuffs. The five-year plan specified capital investment totaling 9 billion 250 million Libyan dinars, with the bulk (86.6 percent) going into development of the state sector. Of these funds, 977.7 million dinars were designated for developing land, 498 million for current needs of agriculture, 139.1 million for building dams and utilization of water resources, and 64 million dinars for development of marine food resources.⁷ In other words, approximately 20 percent of capital funds for the five-year plan were designated for boosting agriculture; annual capital spending in 1976-1980 exceeded by a factor of 1.5 corresponding capital investment in 1973-1975.

In addition, supplementary state subsidies for development of agriculture in the amount of 236 million dinars were allocated from 1970 through 1978.⁸

We should make special mention of problems of development of a fishing industry in Libya. Libya's seacoast stretches 1,900 kilometers. Although catches are growing (approximately 4,500 tons of fish were caught in 1974-1975 as compared with 1,500 tons in 1971-1972⁹), fish continue to be in short supply, and fish prices are steadily rising. The total number of fishermen is decreasing year by year. This is due to the fact that former fishermen prefer to take more highly-paid jobs, which provide surer earnings, which are independent of fluctuations in the size of fish catches in the hazardous coastal waters. The state plans to furnish the fishing fleet with modern fishing equipment in order to improve supply of fish to the population. Libya has entered into cooperation with Tunisia, Japan, Romania, and other nations toward this end; mixed fishing companies are being established.

In the opinion of Libyan economists, state farms are the most promising form of conduct of agriculture. Mechanized state farms to grow wheat, barley, and fodder crops are being established on newly-developed lands in the Jofora, Jebel Al-Akhdar, Fezzan, Sarir, Cufra and other areas, where large-scale agricultural projects are in progress: orchards and melon fields are being planted, dairy farms and sheep farms are being established, as well as apiaries, etc. State experimental stations, plots, and laboratories are developing high-yield varieties of food crops and are studying the effectiveness of utilizing various fertilizers and machinery. More than 3,700 experimental plots have been established for growing high-yield varieties of wheat (Egyptian Summer, City Cyrus, an improved variety of Mahmudi, etc), barley, sesame, peas, beans, potatoes, and onions.

State farms and other farms are administratively under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform. At the same time they have been given extensive authorities, from hiring to independent dealings in the foreign market for the purpose of purchasing required agricultural equipment and improved varieties of seed and fertilizer. There are great difficulties, however, in the operations of state farms and other farms. Income generated from the sale of the products of some farms fails to cover the cost of producing them, farm managers have not yet acquired sufficient management experience, farms are short of manpower, etc. At the same time newly-established livestock operations, which plant their own feed crop acreage, are operating successfully. They have increased their numbers of purebred stock and poultry. These operations supply cooperatives and privately-operated farms with young stock. As of

31 July 1977 14 state and feedlot operations had 13,200 head of cattle. In 1976 13 state livestock farms produced 21 million liters of milk, as compared with 1.3 million in 1971, when there were only 3 such operations in the entire country. Approximately 7,000 high-productivity cows were purchased in the period 1971-1977, which have produced 20,000 calves. During that same period the state sold 2,000 cows, 6,000 heifers and bull calves to improve the local herd, at low prices to peasants farming newly-developed lands. A total of 9 meat and dairy operations of 500 cows each had been established by the end of 1977.¹⁰

The state devoted attention to consolidating self-employed farmer operations into cooperatives. Cooperative production makes it possible to overcome at a faster rate primitive techniques and methods of crop farming and animal husbandry and to incorporate the latest advances in cropping techniques, agronomy, mechanization, and use of chemicals in agriculture.

Distribution of newly developed lands among landless and land-poor peasants is of great social and economic significance. Government funds are being used to build farms with buildings and cropland ready for operation. Landless and land-poor peasants, as well as nomads changing over to a settled way of life voluntarily transfer to these operations. New settlers at first paid half the cost of these farms, while today they pay only one fourth.

Pursuant to the 1970 law on efficient utilization of land, a farm possessor must perform all farm work himself or with the assistance of members of his family. He must concern himself with maintaining soil fertility, take good care of housing, farm buildings, and equipment, and must also make annual purchase payments to the local cooperative for his farm. A farmer is not entitled to sell his farm until all purchase payments have been met. At the same time the farm can be passed on by inheritance. New farms must join into cooperatives and must carry out the recommendations of cooperative boards as well as the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform.

Considerable attention is devoted to development of agricultural cooperatives. In the estimate of the Center for Agricultural research, as of the end of 1976 there were 180 cooperatives in Libya, with stock capital totaling 1.3 million dinars. In the period 1971-1977 the number of shareholder-members increased almost 10-fold, and the number of cooperatives increased to 230. Practically the country's entire settled agricultural population were members of agricultural cooperatives by September 1977.¹¹

The state gives considerable assistance to the cooperatives. Government subsidies are used to build quarters for the boards of cooperatives, storage facilities, etc. Chairmen, clerical personnel, and skilled workers are paid by the state. Tractors, seed, fertilizer, and other capital items are sold to cooperatives at discounts up to 50 percent. The state pays for training bookkeepers, accountants, tractor operators, mechanics, etc for the cooperatives. The cooperatives of various areas of specialization and levels are unified into the Federation of Libyan Cooperatives, which in recent years has been actively participating in the international cooperative movement.

In addition to certain successes in the operation of cooperatives, there still exist substantial shortcomings and difficulties. There are few experienced managerial personnel, there is a shortage of specialists, and the percentage of illiterates among cooperative member-shareholders is quite high. A lack of regulation of purchase prices for certain products, equipment, fertilizer, etc complicates the operations of cooperatives. Libya's leaders are taking steps to solve these problems. A total of 9,000 agricultural specialists were trained in Libya, for example, during the first 9 years of the revolution.¹² Agricultural personnel receive training in special departments at the university, at the agricultural college in the town of Beida, as well as at a number of secondary schools. A decision was made in 1976 to build 7 agricultural colleges.

Libya's leaders are endeavoring to boost labor productivity in agriculture. Special attention is being focused on increasing soil fertility, improving living standards, and eliminating illiteracy among the peasants. Great importance is being attached to utilizing achievements of the scientific and technological revolution in crop farming, animal husbandry, forestry, and fisheries. In an interview with the newspaper AL ARD in November 1978, M. Qadhafi once again stressed the need to develop all land suited for agriculture and to provide the country's population with sufficient quantities of food. He noted that it would be extremely foolish to rely on food imports from abroad and to ignore the potential of domestic agriculture.¹³

A new national economic development program for 1981-1985 has now been drawn up. According to this program, capital investment in the national economy will total 10 billion 595 million dinars.¹⁴ Considerable attention is being devoted to matters of technical training of indigenous personnel, scientific research, and incorporation of scientific and technical advances, including in agricultural production. Growth in the productive resources of agriculture is to be achieved to a significant degree through adoption of modern technology. At the same time attention will be focused on drawing the population into agricultural production. The number of persons employed in agriculture will increase from 153,400 in 1980 to 178,200 in 1985.

Experience in progressive reforms in agriculture in the Libyan Jamahiriya attests to gradual overcoming of the backwardness of this important sector of the economy.

FOOTNOTES

1. AR-RAID, 19 Nov 1969.
2. "Successes of Agricultural Development in the LAR," Tripoli, 1975, page 3 (in Arabic).
3. "Agricultural Research Center," Tripoli, 1976 (in Arabic).
4. "The Step of Man in the Libyan Arab Republic," Tripoli, 1976, page 96 (in Arabic); 1 Libyan dinar = 2 rubles 50 kopecks.

5. "Achievements of the Agrarian Revolution," Book 4, Tripoli, 1978, page 178 (in Arabic).
6. AL JIHAD, 14 Apr 1976.
7. AL FAJR AL JADID, 31 December 1977.
8. Ibid.
9. AL FAJR AL JADID, 11 March 1976.
10. "Achievements of the Agrarian Revolution," op. cit., Book 4, pp 107-108 (in Arabic).
11. AL FAJR AL JADID, 26 March 1978.
12. AT-TAAWUN AZ-ZIRAI, No 3, 1977, page 25.
13. AL ARD, 30 November 1978.
14. AL MUAZZAF, 16 September 1982.

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CATHOLIC CHURCH USES SOCIAL REFORMISM TO COMBAT MARXISM IN AFRICA

[Editorial report] Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 2, March-April 1983 publishes on pages 101-106 a 2000-word article by I. A. Yerasova entitled "The Vatican's Policy in Africa." The article argues that in reaction to "the crisis of Catholicism, especially in the developed countries, and its striving to restore its positions at the expense of the peoples of the developing countries," the church has gone through a major change since the Second Vatican Council. This is a growing interest in questions of social justice, which Yerasova calls "a reformist renewal of capitalist society," and whose roots she traces back to Pope Leo XIII's 1891 encyclical "Rerum Novarum." In this connection the church has associated itself with calls for social justice within African countries and for a better deal for African countries in trade and economic relations with the West. Yerasova sees this as an explicit attempt to compete with "Marxist atheism" for the allegiance of African youth and to "turn the cult into a dynamic means of ideological propaganda."

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CONFERENCE EXAMINES DIVERGENT SOCIAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THIRD WORLD

Moscow *NARODY AZII I AFRIKI* in Russian No 2, Mar-Apr 83 (signed to press 11 Mar 83) pp 127-132

[Article, published under the heading "Scholarly Affairs," by V. P. Il'in: "Theoretical-Methodological Problems of Societal Development"]

[Excerpts] This conference, which was held in Moscow on 12-14 May 1983, was organized by the USSR Academy of Sciences Presidium Central Council of Philosophical (Methodological) Seminars, the Moscow Council of Philosophical (Methodological) Seminars of the Political Education House of the Ministry of Culture and CPSU Moscow City Committee, by the USSR Academy of Sciences Scientific Council on the Combined Problem "Economic Development of Socialism and Competition Between the Two Systems," and by the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Philosophy. Participants included philosophers, historians, economists, and ethnographers from scientific research institutes in Moscow and other cities. More than 40 reports and papers were presented at plenary sessions and session meetings, including reports and papers by specialists in Asian and African studies.

Papers presented at the plenary session by academicians A. M. Rumyantsev, Yu. K. Pletnikov (USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Philosophy), V. V. Kulikov (USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Economics), V. N. Shevchenko (editor of the journal *FILOSOFSKIYE NAUKI*), and V. Zh. Kelle (USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of History of Natural Science and Technology) discussed the following problems: characteristic traits and features of the contemporary era of transition from capitalism to socialism, the natural-historical character of the process of societal development, theory of socioeconomic structures and nonuniformity of societal development, and history of society as a process of man's individual development. A paper by N. A. Simoniya (USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Oriental Studies) entitled "Problem of the Transition Period in the Structural Development of Asia"* was also presented at this session.

I. V. Aleshina (IMEMO) [Institute of World Economics and International Relations] emphasized in her paper entitled "The General and Specific in the Structural Division of Developing Countries" that the question of the structural nature of developing countries continues to be a subject of debate. In her opinion,

* See article by N. A. Simoniya in this issue.

Marx's consolidated periodization of the historical process, which includes a primary (primitive communal) and secondary (class) stage, may be the key to solving this problem. Societies of the secondary stage, possessing essentially common attributes, differ in genesis and structural architectonics. Within the secondary stage I. V. Aleshina distinguishes two historical types of societies: 1) developed capitalist societies, in which capitalism has replaced the slaveholding and feudal modes of production; and 2) developing countries, in which slaveholding and feudalism have not led to the emergence of separate modes of production and have existed in a relatively undivided form, and where the community has played the role of social integrator. In the course of the development of each of these types, a unique structural-genetic code was formed, which continues to influence the socioeconomic and political processes in these societies. The limited integrative capabilities of capitalism place in doubt its ability to overcome the genetic legacy of the past in developing countries. In a situation of contest between the two world systems, the structural process in these countries has taken on properties of a social alternative. The lack of possibilities for radical resolution of social problems within the framework of the secondary stage leads on the one hand to growth of the revolutionary movement and to movement by a number of developing countries over to the side of socialism, and on the other hand to intensification of political reaction in other developing countries.

M. A. Cheshkov (IMEMO) noted in his paper entitled "Marx's Term 'Secondary Stage' and Theoretical Study of a Developing Society" that resolution of the question of the structural character of developing societies on the basis of the currently accepted five-component scheme of societal systems involves certain difficulties. In his opinion, these difficulties are eliminated if the structural description of these societies is determined on the basis of the term "secondary stage," employed by K. Marx in the well-known rough draft of his letter to V. Zasulich. M. A. Cheshkov, just as I. V. Aleshina, developed the thesis of two types of "secondary stage" -- a "Western," characteristic of developed capitalist countries, and an "Eastern," characteristic of developing societies.

A paper by V. G. Rastyannikov (Academy of Sciences Institute of Oriental Studies) entitled "On the Evolution of a Mixed Economy on the Periphery of the World Capitalist Economy" directed attention to the necessity of distinguishing capitalist-oriented development of backward societies and the emergence of a capitalist economy proper in these societies, as well as the need to take into account the profound influence exerted on them by the contest between the two world systems. Changes in productive forces in connection with the scientific and technological revolution also exert considerable influence on the evolution of the mixed economy of these societies. A qualitatively new system of productive forces is being created in the centers of world capitalism on the basis of the achievements of the scientific and technological revolution, while in the developing countries transition to industrial forms of labor is just now taking place. In these conditions the mixed economy of developing countries is becoming a target of attack by multinational corporations. The nonuniformity of development among the different regions of the periphery of the capitalist world is appreciably intensifying, with local "centers" and "peripheries" forming.

Development of capitalism in liberated countries is characterized by three specific features: 1) deepening of the gap between its different stage forms and reproduction of the mixed economy; 2) organic interlocking of foreign capital by the multinational corporations into the economy of these countries and the formation of a comprador stratum; 3) aggressive use of methods of extraeconomic compulsion and support by the state. The economic system of developing countries is going through a profound structural crisis, which is grounded on the crisis of traditional forms of production. A consequence of this is the pauperization of the masses of immediate producers. The universal law of capitalist accumulation on the periphery of world capitalism is most vividly manifested precisely in development of mass pauperism. The structural crisis is also manifested in profound deformation of the class-forming process and in the inability of capital to replace mixed-economy relations with purely capitalist relations.

The state and the government sector of the economy is the principal and essentially the sole force capable of withstanding the disintegrative processes in the reproduction mechanism. The role of the state as organizer and regulator of the economic process and damper of manifestations of socioeconomic deformation, however, is greatly undermined by the narrow-group interests and narrow-group policies of those in power in developing countries.

V. L. Sheynis (IMEMO), in his paper entitled "Formation of Mechanisms of Societal Development in the Countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America," specified the market, the state, and social movements as such fundamental mechanisms. He noted that the market plays a universal role as a mode of economic organization of society, but its development in these countries is being impeded from below by large masses of subsistence and semisubsistence production, and from above by various monopolies, and therefore takes on a retarded and deformed character. The national state, tasked with integrating society, is one of the main forces of economic development in these countries. Incompetent government intervention in the economy, government concessions to the imperialists, and the narrow-group policies of ruling circles, however, frequently lead to destructive consequences. The search for counterbalances to this is a vital problem in developing countries. Reactionary neotraditionalist movements, which reject both capitalism and socialism and which state as their goal a "third path" of development, are developing in some of these countries, alongside the struggle by progressive forces for a noncapitalist path of development. In spite of their anticapitalist directional thrust, they constitute a negative phenomenon from the standpoint of the broader interests of socioeconomic development.

R. M. Nureyev (Moscow State University), in a paper entitled "Specific Features of Primitive Accumulation of Capital in Liberated Countries of Asia," noted disruption of the sequence of stages of development of capitalist industry as one of these important features. Bypassing of the workshop stage of capitalist development by these countries has aggravated the problem of employment. Explosive population growth in these countries as well as the scientific and technological revolution are operating in the same direction. Manpower in these countries continues to carry vestiges of precapitalist relations, especially in agriculture. Transitional, pseudocapitalist forms of production emerge and are

preserved. Individual farming is developing slowly. The single-crop specialization by individual countries and regions is not fostering the development of a domestic market. Indigenous capital in the liberated countries of Asia is heterogeneous; part is linked with the capital of multinational corporations, which has completed or greatly accelerated the process of primitive accumulation only in certain relatively small countries which lack an extensive agrarian periphery (in Singapore, for example). Its mode-forming role is rather modest in the majority of these countries.

Summarizing the conference proceedings, Yu. K. Pletnikov (Academy of Sciences Institute of Philosophy) noted the great positive significance of joint discussion of problems of societal development by philosophers, historians, economists, and ethnographers.

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CONFERENCE DISCUSSES IRANIAN REVOLUTION, SOVIET-IRANIAN TIES

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 2, Mar-Apr 83 (signed to press 11 Mar 83) pp 155-56

[Article, published under the heading "Scholarly Affairs" and subheading "Calendar Notes"]

[Text] A conference entitled "The 1978-1979 Iranian Revolution and Soviet-Iranian Relations" was held on 19 November 1982. Participants included representatives of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the USSR Academy of Sciences IMRD [Institute of the International Workers' Movement], and the Moscow State Institute of International Relations of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The conference was conducted by the department of historical and cultural relations between Soviet and non-Soviet Asia, jointly with the department of Near and Middle Eastern countries, with the participation of staff members from the department of combined problems of international relations and the department of literatures of the peoples of Asia. The conference was opened by Doctor of Historical Sciences P.M. Shastitko.

A number of papers were presented at the conference, dealing with the present situation in the Islamic Republic of Iran and the status of Iranian-Soviet relations, after which a discussion was held. S. L. Agayev (IMRD), in a paper entitled "Distribution of Class and Political Forces in the IRI," drew the conferees' attention to the complexity of development of the revolutionary process in Iran, caused by the great diversity of social-class and political forces acting under the banner of Islam. N. V. Kapyshin, in a paper entitled "The Islamic Factor in Foreign Policy of the IRI," analyzing the specific features of the foreign policy of contemporary Iran, noted the anti-imperialist thrust of IRI foreign policy and the existence of possibilities for cooperation by the USSR and other peace-loving nations with Iran in the international arena; A. Z. Arabadzhyan (Academy of Sciences Institute of Oriental Studies) described the present state of Soviet-Iranian economic relations, with reference to data published by the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations. He stressed in particular that of the 121 industrial installations being built in Iran with the aid of Soviet specialists, construction had been completed on 81 facilities as of 1 January 1982. Examining problems of Iran's foreign trade, A. Z. Arabadzhyan stressed that at the present time approximately one third of all goods entering Iran cross Soviet territory. Ye. A. Orlov (Academy of Sciences Institute of Oriental Studies), in a paper entitled "Attitude of the Various Sociopolitical Forces in Contemporary Iran Toward the Soviet Union," discussed the positions

taken on this matter by the Iranian Government, the ruling Islamic Republican Party, and opposition forces.

Participants in discussion of the presented papers included institute scientific workers S. M. Aliyev, Ye. A. Doroshenko, V. V. Lukov, and others. A. N. Kheyfets (Academy of Sciences Institute of Oriental Studies) summarized the conference proceedings, noting the need to take into consideration observations made in the course of the discussion in writing a group-authored monograph entitled "SSSR i Iran" [The USSR and Iran].

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PRIMAKOV BOOK ON THIRD-WORLD SOCIOECONOMIC PROCESSES REVIEWED

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 2, Mar-Apr 83 (signed to press 11 Mar 83) pp 177-184

[Article, published under the heading "Criticism and Bibliography" and the subheading "Book Reviews," by V. L. Sheynis and A. Ya. El'yanov: "Asia Following Collapse of the Colonial System"*; passages highlighted by use of double-spaced words enclosed in slantlines]

[Text] The further that point in history at which the countries of Asia obtained or restored political independence recedes into the past, the more clearly one can see what a profound turning point in world history has taken place and the more clearly stand out in relief problems which are so unprecedented in scale and character that all attempts to describe them, and particularly to solve them "on analogy," are clearly doomed to failure. In the 1980's these problems are viewed not quite the same -- and sometimes quite differently -- as in the 1970's and 1960's. Therefore, although a great many general studies of contemporary Asia have been written in the USSR and abroad, each new book which summarizes our knowledge in this area and, consequently, revises certain established approaches and assessments and outlines new solutions, evokes keen and universal interest. For this reason the new book by Ye. M. Primakov is also assured a wide readership.

Setting for himself the task of "showing the complex profile of postcolonial Asia," as well as the conflictive and ambiguous nature of the changes which are taking place in the developing world, the author concentrates attention on processes "which do not fit within the framework of conventional notions and which require new approaches" (pp 5, 6), determinedly rejects certain points of view (including ones which have become quite widespread), agrees with others, and formulates his own positions on debated issues. A focus toward new (or interpreted in a new manner) phenomena and processes, active involvement in a number of debates going on within the scholarly community, and an endeavor to draw the reader's attention to that which distinguishes this book from other general works -- these are the characteristic features which give this book its own individual countenance.

* Ye. M. Primakov, "Vostok posle krakha kolonial'noy sistemy," Moscow, Glav. red. vost. lit-ry izd-va Nauka, 1982, 208 pages.

Ye. M. Primakov's book is a problem-addressing book in the best meaning of the term. The author discusses problems facing the developing world and which this world is placing before mankind. The author emphasizes the fact that tendencies the development of which will determine in large measure the countenance which the developing world will assume tomorrow are in a state of flux, as well as the problematic nature of many solutions and assessments which science can propose today. Continuing the discussion, the author specifies new points and areas of future debate. We shall discuss certain of these in this review.

Ye. M. Primakov begins his analysis with a question which is ignored in many studies on developing countries: do these countries comprise a community or a conglomerate? If a community (which evidently is the predominating view in our literature), then what are its criteria? The fact of insufficient attention devoted to the initial point of analysis does not always involve theoretical "unconcern." A large percentage, and perhaps the majority of scholars are of the opinion that there exists a unified, main attribute which enables one to outline the community of developing countries in today's world and to bring its most important, essential socioeconomic features under a single heading. In some instances the fact of a mixed economy is taken as such a criterion, in other cases dependence (or, in the most carefully elaborated version, dependent type of development), in still others -- a transitional nature, etc.

Ye. M. Primakov declares himself to be a resolute advocate of a combined approach to determining the community of developing countries and suggests a number of criteria which characterize a given community in level of development of productive resources, type of internal economic and international production relations, etc. The author insists that within the aggregate of criteria according to which community can be distinguished in today's world, "there is no one main feature which determines all others" (page 9). Two important conclusions proceed from this position -- which the reviewers share: an extraordinary socioeconomic heterogeneity within the developing world, considerably greater than between developed capitalist and socialist states, and a "fuzziness" of the boundaries which separate it from the two other worlds.

While remaining a part of a community the fundamental composition and typological features of which are fairly stable, some developing countries may approach much closer to capitalist or socialist nations in certain criteria -- level of general economic development, place in world economic relations, sociopolitical organization, etc -- than to the main core of their community. We shall note that there is contained within this heterogeneity the possibility of, if not disintegration of the developing world in the foreseeable future, then at least a significantly greater differentiation within it and "withdrawal" from it by a number of countries which already today occupy a boundary position. In counterbalance to fatalistic views according to which deepening dependence and relative weakness of development is the inevitable fate of all developing countries which remain within the world capitalist economy, the author defends a different and, it would seem, more realistic and constructive position, which takes into account the effect of diversified countertendencies in today's world.

Formulating the principal features of community of the developing countries, Ye. M. Primakov formulates and presents his solutions to a number of complex

theoretical problems. One applies to the problem of dependence. Dependence has been viewed in the Soviet scholarly literature of the present time primarily as a common denominator which characterizes the position of all developing countries. The author shifts emphasis to differences which exist between them in this area as well. Correctly stressing that complex realities cannot be explained from any extreme position: a position which declares the independence of developing countries to be a fiction, or a position which equally one-sidedly "places" all these countries into the camp of anti-imperialist forces (page 30), he juxtaposes a range of diversified situations to the standardizing notion of "dependent path of development" and allows for the possibility of transition by certain Afro-Asian and Latin American countries to customary relations of interdependence in the world capitalist economy (pp 12-17). We believe that such an approach is more reasoned and dialectical and that it points the way to an important area of future research: on the one hand, identification and classification of various forms, types, and versions of dependence and interdependence in the world capitalist economy (which of course cannot be categorized in only two or three gradations by quantitative and qualitative characteristics); on the other hand, analysis of factors which will enable certain countries gradually to climb up the steps which lead to greater economic independence.

Not one-dimensional juxtaposing of dependence and independence, but concentration of attention on intermediate, transitional forms, which express a weakening of the position of imperialism, a certain enhancement of the role of developing countries, and the possibility for some of them to change their position in the world capitalist economy, in some respects pulling equal with developed countries, signifies an important step forward in analyzing the political-economic mechanisms of the contemporary world.

Ye. M. Primakov also presents his own interpretation of another issue which has evoked a great deal of debate -- the problem of a mixed economy, stressing its dynamic, changing character and opposing the notion that the mixed economy is a unique "interstructural" stage, a "gap" between stages. Such a formulation of the issue shifts emphasis to elucidation of leading production relations which, as the author correctly notes, can also be represented by an aggregate of structures unified by common structural attributes (pp 18-19). Although the author does not employ the term "gosudarstvennyy uklad" [state structural edifice], which has become fully accepted in the scholarly literature, he proceeds from the position that the state sector is a special structural edifice of the economy, which functions on the basis of different mechanisms than private-entrepreneurship systems.

What is the socioeconomic nature of this structural edifice? State-capitalist in countries developing along the lines of capitalism, and not state-capitalist, "transitional," although not yet socialist -- in countries of socialist orientation, the author replies (pp 21, 101). Generally accepting this formulation of the issue, we should like to emphasize that it enables one to delineate the problem. In our opinion future investigations should concentrate on the political-economy aspects of interaction between the state and private-entrepreneurship structures and on those characteristics of the state structural edifice which make it a /not entirely/ or at least /not such/ a state capitalist structure, even in countries of a capitalist path of development, as we are familiar with from the history of developed capitalist

(and socialist) countries. For, in the first place, its functions do not at all boil down to "helping" in establishment of the capitalist mode of production and, in the second place, capitalism, establishment of which is taking place in the majority of developing countries, is distinguished by a considerable uniqueness, since it initially is supported by the operation not only of spontaneous mechanisms (disintegration of precapitalist structures on the basis of the law of value, market, competition, free transfusion of capital, etc), as a result of which the correlation between state and private forms of economy shifts sharply in favor of the former. Under these circumstances shifting accent to the leading role and the certain ambivalence of the state economy seems to be quite warranted.

Ye. M. Primakov is among those Soviet scholars who drew attention earlier than others to the deepening differentiation of developing countries. Differentiation, he stresses in his new book, is a paramount trend; it proceeds along many lines and will become strengthened under the influence both of external and internal factors. Operation of the forces of the world capitalist economy: differing influence of structural crises of capitalism and differences in attractiveness for foreign capital, the author points out, deepen differentiation. Countries which have advanced further economically are of considerable interest to foreign capital, while a vigorous influence of such capital in turn gives these countries certain additional advantages and fosters their increasing separation from the bulk of developing nations (pp 42-43, 131-132). The law of uneven development operates differently, notes Ye. M. Primakov, basing his argument on the calculations of B. M. Dolotin, in both parts of the world capitalist economy: a tendency toward equalizing levels of development predominates in its developed portion, and a tendency toward increasing gaps in the developing portion (page 35).

All this logically draws one's attention to countries situated on the boundaries of the developing world. Nations of medium-developed capitalism form one of the groups of such countries, constituted chiefly according to criteria of level and type of socioeconomic development. (We shall note the agreement between the author's view and that of the reviewers on this question, see pp 44-45). So-called "subimperialist focal areas" comprise another group, which only in part coincides in composition with the first group and is formed by a different criterion.

The problem of "subimperialisms" began to be discussed in Soviet scientific literature only comparatively recently, while the term itself has not yet acquired an unambiguous interpretation and sometimes evokes debate. Whatever objections might arise, however, one can scarcely succeed in contesting the thesis that at least some of the most developed "rich" and (or) large developing countries, while remaining part of the developing world primarily on the basis of socioeconomic characteristics, by their linkages and position in the world capitalist economy fit into its imperialist structures. The unique "seizure reaction" of the term (and also, like it or not, of the problem) "subimperialisms" on the part of some Soviet investigators is apparently due to the fact that they refuse to see imperialist tendencies, even with the prefix "sub," in countries which have not yet risen to the stage of monopoly capitalism. And in those cases where such tendencies are acknowledged, their bearers are viewed exclusively as clients of the main capitalist powers, "relay-countries," as it were, through which imperialist expansion of the "centers" is accomplished.

Ye. M. Primakov persuasively demonstrates that his is an obvious simplification. "Subimperialist focal points" and "mini-centers" in the developing world naturally arise in an environment in which there already exist capitalist monopolies, economic division of the world, relations of domination and subordination which are characteristic of monopoly capitalism. Far from every participant in the system of imperialist domination, expansion and exploitation, however, if we are speaking of a state-organized (and therefore isolated to a certain degree) ruling class of a given country must represent finance capital established as a result of a protracted process of concentration and centralization of production, a merging of industry with banks, etc, as was the case in classic variants. As early as the beginning of this century V. I. Lenin noted affiliation with imperialism and participation in division of the world, both territorial and economic, by a number of countries in which capitalism was still far from entering the monopoly stage (Portugal, the British Dominions, etc).

The nutrient medium in which "subimperialist" tendencies thrive in the developing world is today much broader and more diversified. Processes of two kinds take place in it. First of all, joining of imperialist centers by ruling groups (not only the bourgeoisie) in a number of developing countries as a junior partner, participating in expansion and exploitation. This is demonstrated in the book under review using materials on export of capital from developing countries, the emergence of "mini-multinational corporations" in these countries, etc. Secondly -- and this is of the greatest interest, in our opinion -- consolidation of relatively independent local "centers of power" which are pursuing their own aims, supported by considerable material resources and arms, centers which, as Ye. M. Primakov correctly emphasizes, begin a struggle for spheres of influence not only with one another but also with developed capitalist countries (page 47), since the sphere of noncoincidence of interests of both may expand under certain conditions (page 51). This is a comparatively new trend, underestimation of which can lead to serious distortion of the picture of the contemporary world and miscalculations in policy.

While supporting the author's position, we must stress that "subimperialist" centers emerge on the basis not only of the objective laws governing the movement of monopoly capital and deliberate strategy of neocolonialism, but also specific conditions in developing countries. Although in some of these countries national monopolies have also formed, they are "introduced" at relatively lower levels of general economic and social development, and their emergence proper in present conditions many times does not signify that they have transformed the given steps by stages. "Subimperialist" tendencies in the developing world are manifested at all stages of development: not only relatively higher stages in Latin America, but also fairly low stages in Asia and Africa. As a rule this is not only premonopoly but frequently also pre-capitalist imperialism.

"Subimperialist" centers emerge wherever the following factors come together: /material/ factors (a high concentration of one or several items which lend themselves to monopolization and which acquire value in the bourgeois world, such as: "reaccumulated" wealth, natural resources, territory, demographic potential, etc); /external economic and external political/ factors (expansionist and hegemonist aspirations, exploitation and subjugation of other peoples); /internal political/ factors (preponderance in favor of fairly narrow imperialist, hegemonist, essentially antinational forces, hypertrophy of government

authority with an undeveloped civil society). Within the system of imperialist relationships, "reaccumulated" (from the standpoint of level of economic development and social forms of production and distribution) wealth, as well as objects which do not possess value but which acquire a price (such as various forms of military participation), are transformed into capital, generate income, which is partially recycled and partially expended, not always in a capitalist manner, but frequently in a feudal manner or in the spirit of certain "Eastern despotic" models.

Having accumulated certain material resources, arms, etc, "subimperialist" regimes also begin to come forth with their own ambitions (and not only in an intermediary role) toward their weaker neighbors. Aspirations for autonomy from the main centers of imperialism also grow stronger. Sometimes rather sharp clashes occur. Although the collapse of the Shah's regime in Iran and important changes in Brazil, where "subimperialist" tendencies were most distinctly manifested at one time, would seem to indicate their instability and reversibility, these trends express objective mechanisms which may occur again in various places, and therefore investigation of these trends is a highly relevant scientific and practical task.

It is inseparably linked with determination of the specific features of the revolutionary process in Asia. Ye. M. Primakov examines in detail the specific features of the interaction of three factors -- formation of the material preconditions for revolution, maturation of a revolutionary situation, and capability of the vanguard class to lead a revolution -- and reaches an important conclusion pertaining to the nonuniformity of maturation of conditions not only in the "horizontal" (between countries) but also in the "vertical" (degree of readiness of the enumerated conditions) scheme (page 57). He stresses that a revolutionary system, expressing the accumulation of socio-political conflicts (page 61), usually becomes the most dynamic element. The author devotes considerable attention to the specific features of the crisis of the "upper strata" and "lower strata" in Asia and notes that the "forms of accumulation of resentment and explosive anger... in many respects bear the imprint of the character of the 'lower strata' in developing countries" and that the forms and manifestations of protest frequently "fail to fit neatly into traditional notions about revolution" (pp 67-68).

The traditionalism of the East, which has so loudly proclaimed its presence in a number of social movements of the 1970's and 1980's, is forcing revision of certain traditional scientific concepts, and therefore the author is fully justified in turning to a special analysis of the effect of tradition on contemporary life and problems, and in particular the influence of Islam of revolution. A unique "neotraditionalization" of social actions is a comparatively new phenomenon which has not yet become firmly established, and categorical appraisals might prove to be premature at this point. Nevertheless a number of opinions stated by Ye. M. Primakov are very important, no matter how events develop. These include his conclusions about the "stable, not short-lived influence of Islam on political processes" (page 71), on the growing politicization of Islam (page 74), his statement about the total nature of Islamic doctrine, which claims the role of not only a religious system but also a determinant of the economy, governmental system, and the entire way of life (pp 71-72, 75-79), his warning about reactionary tendencies stimulated by the events in Iran (page 81), etc.

Nevertheless neotraditionalist movements in general and the events in Iran in particular also enable one to draw, in our opinion, a number of more far-reaching conclusions. The splash of neotraditionalism has shown how dangerous it is to underestimate the independent role of sociocultural factors in the development of Asian societies and how one-sided it is to ascribe such movements excessively to class interests and common class elements. Religion not only offers accessible forms for expression of class and political interests (page 79) but also itself expresses in concentrated form the interests of a certain sociocultural community which is threatened by forces of destruction.

A religious (or quasireligious) vestment proves to be very strong, sometimes almost impenetrable. Solidly covering an amorphous social domain which has not yet been polarized around contemporary classes, it impedes the processes of social-class self-determination, blocks free play of political forces, and forcibly pushes atomized elements toward one another -- individuals, groups, etc, preventing them from forming other combinations. As the Ocean in Lem's "Solaris," this appropriately organized social environment sometimes successfully opposes external effects -- political influences, new cultural stereotypes, and ideas emerging on a different soil, not only reactionary but progressive as well.

Acting as the godfather of certain values of the local culture, distinctiveness, and traditional way of life, these movements emphasize their nonacceptance or even undisguised hostility toward influences penetrating from the outside and the bearers of the influences. They either declare themselves opponents of modernization and reforms, or else give them an interpretation which has little in common with genuine progress. In some instances they raise the banner of traditional religion, while in others they invent their own religion, transforming into ideological dogmas, which are not subject to discussion, various elements of nonreligious knowledge, including elements of scientific origin.

These movements, which encompass the realm of mass consciousness, ideology, politics, and culture, arise in a backward society which has been drawn into the seething torrent of world development, which attempts in this manner to counter what in many respects are destructive, antihuman, and asocial external influences and endeavors to conserve the traditional features which are characteristic of it, rejecting innovations, which it considers unsuitable. Of course such movements do not remain totally alien to all new ideas. Frequently they incorporate into their structure not only a modern set of means of political struggle and organization (not to mention technology), but ideas as well. Going through a process of crossing with traditional elements in the public consciousness, humane and progressive ideas frequently change to the point of unrecognizability.

And although it is probably still a bit early to judge the strength and durability of sociopolitical structures which have emerged on the crest of such movements, one more "program" for solving difficult problems of developing societies has been proclaimed in Asia. This is one of the important results of sociopolitical development of the 1970's, and it would be erroneous to view it only within the coordinates of conventional categories. Anti-imperialism (not only in words, but also in deeds), which is unquestionably characteristic of these movements, and anti-bourgeois sentiment, which is more problematic but

is loudly proclaimed, do not yet provide us with grounds to see in them special, even if with a certain touch of reactionary character, offshoots of the national liberation movement. The formula "Basically progressive content -- backward form" is not appropriate: millions of people have been mobilized under the banner of reactionary utopia. And although, one must assume, such a utopia, just as any other utopia, is unachievable in a completed form, one must see a serious threat to social progress in certain developing countries in the actual scope and true content, and one must loudly proclaim this fact.

The author has devoted considerable attention to countries of socialist orientation: to the criteria on the basis of which they can be defined, and to conflicts on noncapitalist transition. The reasoned, realistic approach which distinguishes the entire book is quite clearly manifested here as well.

The boundary between countries belonging to opposite social orientations is not so clearly distinguishable "on the spot" as might seem at first glance. Therefore determination of reliable criteria which can be used as a test to determine whether a given country is of socialist orientation, whether it is departing from a socialist orientation or is amassing potential hindering such a departure (pp 95-96), is an important scientific and practical task. The author approaches the problem of criteria without any of the maximalism which is characteristic of a certain segment of our literature. Concentrating attention on amassing progressive elements in various areas of societal affairs, he correctly rejects the view that expansion of capitalist structures and utilization of state capitalism per se indicate departure from socialist orientation (page 100), and he also stresses the stability of that social structure which is characteristic of countries of both orientations and in its existing form cannot be adequate either to the socialist or capitalist system (pp 103-106).

The author presents an interesting analysis of conflicts which are manifested in various areas of the affairs of countries of socialist orientation, such as ignoring economic mechanisms and people's needs by those in power in a number of these countries (page 109), concentration of economic efforts on prestige construction projects (page 110), and reorganization of property relations which is incommensurate with existing conditions (page 111). Ye. M. Primakov also states what is practically the most acute social problem of countries of socialist orientation -- activation of the masses to carry out and defend progressive reforms. He reasonably states that responsibility for the fact that such activation is frequently weak is due to a disinclination or inability on the part of those in power to take the necessary measures (page 112). We shall note, however, that the problem also has another aspect: the "upper strata" not only do not want (and make every effort to oppose) such activation, "socialization in fact," and genuine oversight over the authorities by masses which have been democratically organized, not organized in an authoritarian manner, and they have no grasp of the "lower strata," not having been schooled in independent political struggle and, in addition, shut off from such schooling both by an entire aggregate of experiential conditions and by the power of traditional beliefs and concepts. This is an obvious and very acute problem.

The concluding sections of the monograph show the place of developing countries in the world economy and politics. The author examines in detail the evolution of government "assistance" by developed capitalist countries to developing

countries, the directions and consequences of expansion by the multinational corporations, the causes of the energy crisis and the changes to which it has led in the system of neocolonialism. He points out that developing countries have formed a "third subsystem of international relations" (page 165), analyzes the role of the nonaligned movement, and draws the reader's attention to the fact that in the last 10-15 years the developing countries have become parties to the arms race in a dangerous manner and at an increasing rate (pp 188-190).

In this part of the book the author specifies another important problem for future discussion: the dangerous consequences of the gap between the role of developing countries in world politics, which has definitely increased in recent decades (if only because prior to the collapse of the colonial system this role was practically zero, while in the first years of independence their external political activeness, with few exceptions, was minimal) and their place in the world economy (changes in this domain cannot be characterized as unambiguously). The author correctly raises objections against extreme appraisals of trends prevailing in the world capitalist economy: stagnation of productive resources in its developed subsystem, or the diminishing significance of the "periphery" for the reproduction process in the "centers." Excessively categorical opinions (including opinions expressed by one of the reviewers at the beginning of the 1970's) on this latter point indeed need revising. In the first place, however, the place of developing countries in the world economy is a highly heterogeneous economic category, which has many dimensions. We have not yet learned to consolidate them into a single indicator. As the author points out, while the role of developing countries as suppliers of a number of commodity raw materials has more or less steadily (in any case up to the 1970's) increased (page 118), the share of capital investment by multinational corporations in developing countries as a percentage of their overall capital investments has stabilized (pp 130-132). Secondly, in resolving the question of change in the place of the developing countries in the world economy, one must take into consideration their growing differentiation. If we separate from the bulk of developing countries those nations the linkages of which with the "centers" are characterized by Ye. M. Primakov as an "asymmetrical interdependence," then with regard to the former and latter we shall probably reach other (and different) conclusions than with a combined analysis.

It is impossible in a single review to discuss every aspect of a small but profound and substantial work. We believe that the author has succeeded in convincingly achieving his principal objective: "To show not only the uniqueness but also the great complexity of the processes which have been developing in Asia following collapse of the colonial system" (page 196), to concentrate the reader's attention on new problems, as well as unresolved problems which are still being debated, and to outline the general historical perspective in which the search for their solution will take place. Of course not everything in the book is of equal value. In a number of places the illustrative examples seem unnecessary. Some errors and inaccuracies are encountered, which can be easily corrected in subsequent editions. One should hardly view a developing /society/ as a part of the world capitalist /economy/ (page 19): this terminological inaccuracy could lead to underestimation of the role of non-economic factors, which are especially important in the affairs of a given society. There was no longer an "autocracy" in Iran by 1979 (page 29). In

some important /structural/ indicators (for example, percentage share of industry, construction, transportation and communications, and government consumption in gross national product) there has nevertheless occurred an appreciable convergence between the "periphery" and "centers," while it has even outstripped the "centers" in rate of accumulation (page 33).

But this of course is not the main point. Breadth of encompassment and a fresh approach in stating the truly important problems of contemporary Asia, focus on debates -- past and future -- and the lively interest not of a detached on-looker but of a participant in the struggle and the events will unquestionably guarantee this book's success.

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BOOK ON WESTERN AID TO AFRICAN STATES REVIEWED

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[Article, published under the heading "Criticism and Bibliography" and the sub-heading "Book Reviews," by G. I. Rubinshteyn: "Capitalist 'Aid' to Developing Countries. Mechanism, Character and Directions of Influence on African Countries"*)]

[Text] Economic aid by industrially developed capitalist countries to developing countries is one of the new phenomena in world external economic relations, which have emerged and become quite widespread since collapse of the colonial system of imperialism. This term is defined as the systematic transfer of resources to developing countries on more favorable terms than is normally the case in world credit and financial markets, and to some extent even gratis. The problems of economic aid can be understood only in close interlinkage with issues of policy, as well as with the "traditional" forms of external economic relations, that is, foreign trade, export of capital, and monetary-financial issues. Aspects of capitalist "aid" have been briefly discussed in textbooks and monographs dealing with the political economy of capitalism, as well as in the economic encyclopedia "Politicheskaya ekonomiya" [Political Economy] (in articles by M. M. Avsenev, V. P. Panov, and N. A. Arkhipov). To date, however, few comprehensive studies dealing with this subject matter have appeared in the Soviet scholarly literature. We can name, for example, the following books: B. V. Rybakov and L. V. Stepanov, "Pomoshch' kapitalisticheskikh stran v politike i strategii imperializma" [Assistance by Capitalist Countries in the Politics and Strategy of Imperialism] (1964); V. V. Smirnov, "Rol' vneshnikh faktorov v ekonomicheskoy razvitii stran 'tret'yego mira'. Vneshnyaya trgovlya i ekonomicheskaya pomoshch'" [The Role of External Factors in Economic Development of "Third World" Countries. Foreign Trade and Economic Aid] (Moscow, 1975); M. A. Aleksandrov and A. Ye. Granovskiy, "Ekonomicheskaya pomoshch' kapitalisticheskikh gosudarstv stranam Yuzhnoy Azii" [Economic Aid by Capitalist Nations to the Countries of Southern Asia] (Moscow, 1973); plus a few others. These studies, however, are now outdated in part, and they do not contain an

* V. S. Baskin, "Kapitalisticheskaya 'pomoshch'" razvivayushchimsya stranam. Mekhanizm, kharakter i napravleniya vozdeystviya na strany Afriki," Moscow, Glav. red. vost. lit-ry izd-va Nauka, 1982, 232 pages.

analysis of new aspects which have appeared beginning in the latter half of the 1970's. The author of the monograph under review seeks to fill in this gap, basing his discussion primarily on the example of Western aid to developing countries in Africa.

The introduction and the first two chapters of this monograph deal with explaining the essence of economic aid by capitalist countries and defining its volume and structure. As the author shows, the question of the fundamental political-economic essence of economic aid given by capitalist countries is a matter to be debated. The majority of Soviet authors are of the opinion that this aid is one of the forms of export of capital. Some Soviet investigators, however, challenge this claim, proceeding from the position that the funds allocated by a capitalist state for purposes of economic aid do not directly lead to the appropriation of surplus value, and frequently are not even intended to be repaid. Such an opinion is stated, for example, in "Kurs politicheskoy ekonomii" [A Course in Political Economy], N. A. Tsagolov, editor (Moscow, 1973), and in a book by N. I. Kirey entitled "Alzhir i Frantsiya, 1962-1971" [Algeria and France, 1962-1971] (Moscow, 1973).

V. S. Baskin analyzes in detail the arguments advanced by advocates of both points of view and compares them with statements made by the founders of Marxism-Leninism. Following the lead of his predecessors, he reaches the conclusion that aid after all is one of the forms of export of state capital, but a very specific form, characteristic of the contemporary stage of the general crisis of capitalism and radical change in the correlation of forces in the international arena. Aid comprises outlays assumed by the government of a developed capitalist country for the purpose of creating and maintaining essential social conditions of capitalist reproduction and continuation of exploitation of developing countries.

In connection with this, the functions performed by capitalist aid as well as the attitude of the imperialist powers and developing countries toward this aid are of a highly conflictive nature. In the first chapter the author convincingly argues that economic aid given by capitalist countries is an instrument of neocolonialism; it is intended to foster the development of liberated countries along a capitalist road and to maintain the dependence of these countries on the imperialist "donors." The granting of aid fosters expansion of export of goods and private capital from imperialist powers and their deep penetration into the economy of developing countries.

Nevertheless, as is demonstrated on pages 16-17 of the monograph, ruling circles in the Western powers are not inclined to increase this aid in unlimited fashion; they grant it only under specific circumstances. In particular, the United States makes every effort to limit the granting of government economic aid to developing countries, since U.S. leaders consider the export of private capital to be the principal element of influence on these countries: developing countries should follow an economic "open door" policy in order to create optimal conditions for investment by U.S. monopolies.

The governments and the public at large in many developing countries have become convinced through their own experience of the exploiter essence of capitalist

aid. Nevertheless in most cases they are not about to refuse it, but demand increased aid, since they are in acute need of external resources and consider such a form of acquisition of resources more acceptable than inviting in multinational monopolies. At the same time these countries are demanding radical changes in the terms of and areas where aid is given. The materials in the first chapter persuasively illustrate a graphic statement from a foreign magazine, quoted by the author in the introduction, that "aid is a kind of lever on which two antagonistic forces are pushing" (page 5).

A realistic assessment of the present situation defines, as the author demonstrates in his conclusions at the end of the first chapter, the high-principled position taken by the socialist countries regarding capitalist aid (page 18). The USSR and the other countries of the socialist community support the demands of the nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America that the volume of aid be increased and that it be freed of conditions which are in conflict with a course of policy aimed at independent development. The socialist nations join the developing countries in believing that aid given by capitalist countries should constitute compensation for that damage which long years of colonial exploitation inflicted on the liberated countries. The nations of the socialist community have indicated in their statements at international forums that an end to the arms race and disarmament would make possible a considerable increase in volume of aid to developing countries, to help them overcome their socioeconomic backwardness (pp 17-18).

Of considerable interest is the author's critique of the methodological principles employed by bourgeois statistics of capitalist aid, contained in the second chapter of the monograph, where the author exposes attempts by Western theorists to present in an apologetic light the contribution made by the imperialist powers to the economic development of liberated countries. For this purpose they often count as aid the export of private capital, as well as the granting of various commercial credits and loans. Bringing clarity to this issue, V. S. Baskin presents a scientific picture of the dynamics of capitalist aid, its place in the overall flow of external resources to developing countries, as well as the structure of and conditions for granting aid.

As is evident from the figures cited in the volume, the actual volume of government development aid given to African countries by the principal capitalist donors (EEC member countries and the United States) increased insignificantly in the 1970's and is far below the level recommended by the UN; the level of aid given by France, which has a particular interest in economic ties with Africa, is somewhat greater than that of other West European powers. The share of U.S. aid as a percentage of gross national product is smaller than that of the majority of Western European countries.

The main African recipients of aid (as is the case in other regions of the developing world) are relatively economically developed countries which possess considerable natural resources, which offer favorable opportunities for profitable investment of government and private capital. The economically least developed countries which need aid receive considerably less. The terms on which funds are granted by capitalist countries, as is indicated by the materials in the monograph, are steadily worsening. The percentage share of

subsidies and other favorable-term arrangements is declining, while the percentage share of funds granted on market terms is increasing (page 27).

A great deal of materials which are valuable in a problem and cognitive respect are contained in the subsequent chapters, in which the author examines the characteristic features of economic, food and technical assistance by capitalist countries and reveals the methodology developed by bourgeois economists and practical workers for determining the advisability of slated projects, planning and execution of various measures connected with aid. The author shows both those features which are common to all capitalist donors and the specific approach of individual Western powers.

The sixth chapter deals with "bound aid" by capitalist countries. It analyzes in detail additional benefits gained by Western powers as a result of the fact that each of them compels aid recipients to purchase equipment or other goods directly from the country which has granted credits. This creates for the creditor nation and the monopolies based in that country the opportunity to force on a developing country prices for its products which are higher than world market prices.

The seventh chapter shows the interlinkages between economic aid by capitalist powers and the foreign indebtedness of developing countries. As a result of increasingly tougher terms for obtaining credits and a general worsening of the economic situation of developing countries, their debt burden has reached threatening dimensions. Many of these countries are on the brink of bankruptcy and have been forced to resort to additional loans, ending up in financial bondage. Their just demands for a fundamental solution to problems of indebtedness, advanced at international forums, are rejected by the Western powers.

In a brief concluding chapter, the author formulates the principal conclusions of his study. In contrast to the export of private capital, the functions of aid include helping achieve the strategic objectives of imperialism in developing countries. The very nature of distribution of aid among recipient countries and by targets of investment is dictated first and foremost not by the actual needs of the recipients but rather by political and economic considerations on the part of the creditor nations. A substantial portion of the resources entering a country as aid ends up in the hands of the corrupt bourgeois elite group in countries developing along a capitalist road. A trend toward relying on internal resources and lessening dependence on external aid is becoming increasingly more prominent in the economic policy of developing countries in Africa and other regions of the world. At the same time, since at the present historical stage developing countries cannot entirely renounce aid, they are advancing a number of just demands toward the capitalist powers, calling for a change in the character and areas of application of aid. These demands are one of the elements of the struggle for establishment of a new international economic order. The concluding chapter also contains a concise description of economic and technical assistance by the Soviet Union, which is in conformity with the root interests of the liberated countries.

The monograph does contain some shortcomings.

First of all, in our opinion the structure of this study is not very precise. For example, the author states on page 6: "In approaching investigation of the problem of aid, one should specify two groups of issues. On the one hand the tools of aid should be examined, while on the other hand there should be study of the target areas of aid and the specific features of the effect of aid on the economy of the recipient country. In conformity with this, the book can be divided into two parts. In the first part the author examines the essence of aid, its principal types, and the financial terms and policies of the main donors. In the second part the author studies questions connected with the economic consequences of utilization of aid and reveals deficiencies inherent in various types of aid." This scheme, as conceived by the author, seems logical, but unfortunately he does not adhere to it in his presentation. It is difficult to determine just where this "second part" begins in the book. Only the brief eighth chapter (15 pages out of 220 pages of text) deals with examination of the fundamental problems of the effect of aid on the socioeconomic development of the African countries, and this chapter also repeats a number of points already presented in previous chapters (for example, about the functioning of "food assistance"). Of course other chapters contain information on the effect of various types of aid on the economy of the recipient countries, but no integral picture results. We feel that another negative point is the absence of a detailed classification of individual types of aid in the early chapters, as well as insufficient attention to the specific use designation of aid (this applies in particular to "economic aid").

We feel that it is wrong that the general description of resources sent to developing countries (the second chapter) does not contain an analysis of the activities of the International Monetary Fund. In recent years this financial organization has greatly stepped up its activities in developing countries, and a portion of the loans it grants now are long-term.

In spite of these defects, on the whole the monograph represents a serious scholarly study. It brings clarity to some theoretical problems connected with the essence and functions of capitalist aid, and at the same time gives an analysis of new trends connected with the present stage of neocolonialist policy of the Western powers. Those sections in which the author critically examines attempts by bourgeois economists to exaggerate the extent of aid and to embellish its results are particularly important. This book discusses in detail for the first time the mechanisms of functioning of aid and the methods employed in the West to determine priorities and to assess the effectiveness of individual measures contained within the aid system.

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